Practical Shape - A Theory of Practical Reasoning

Jonathan Dancy aims to establish the possibility of reasoning to action, by showing how similar it is to reasoning to belief. He offers a general theory of reasoning, which smoothly admits the differences there may be between the two types, while also considering the possibility of reasoning to hope, to fear, to doubt, and to intention.

List of contents

• Introduction


• 1: What Is the (Supposed) Problem about Practical Reasoning?


• 2: How Practical Reasoning is Possible


• 3: The Material Theory of Practical Reasoning


• 4: From the Practical to the Theoretical


• 5: Moral Reasoning


• 6: Taking Stock


• 7: Instrumental Reasoning


• 8: Reasoning to Normative Belief


• 9: Reasoning to Intention


• 10: Loose Ends

About the author

Jonathan Dancy has worked at the University of Texas at Austin since 2005. He previously taught at the University of Keele for 25 years and then at the University of Reading before retiring in the UK in 2011. His books include Practical Reality (2000) and Ethics Without Principles (2004).

Summary

Jonathan Dancy aims to establish the possibility of reasoning to action, by showing how similar it is to reasoning to belief. He offers a general theory of reasoning, which smoothly admits the differences there may be between the two types, while also considering the possibility of reasoning to hope, to fear, to doubt, and to intention.

Product details

• Authors: Jonathan Dancy, Jonathan (Professor of Philosophy Dancy
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Languages: English
• Product format: Paperback / Softback
• Released: 09.07.2020
• EAN: 9780198865827
• ISBN: 978-0-19-886582-7
• No. of pages: 224
• Subjects: Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Philosophy: general, reference works; PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body, PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology, PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Ethics & moral philosophy, Ethics and moral philosophy, Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge, Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge