Probabilistic Knowledge

Sarah Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. She introduces the notion of probabilistic content and shows how it plays a central role not only in epistemology, but in the philosophy of mind and language. Just you can believe and assert propositions, you can believe and assert probabilistic contents.

List of contents

• 1: The case for probabilistic contents


• 2: The case for probabilistic assertion


• 3: Epistemic modals and probability operators


• 4: Indicative conditionals


• 5: The case for probabilistic knowledge


• 6: Factivity


• 7: Skepticism


• 8: Knowledge and belief


• 9: Knowledge and action


• 10: Knowledge and persons


• Appendix: A formal semantics for epistemic vocabulary

About the author

Sarah Moss is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She received her A.B. in Mathematics from Harvard University and her B.Phil. in Philosophy from Oxford University, where she studied as a Marshall Scholar. She received her Ph.D. in Philosophy with a minor in Linguistics from MIT in 2009.

Summary

Sarah Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. She introduces the notion of probabilistic content and shows how it plays a central role not only in epistemology, but in the philosophy of mind and language. Just you can believe and assert propositions, you can believe and assert probabilistic contents.

Product details

• Authors: Sarah Moss, Sarah (Associate Professor of Philosophy Moss, Moss Sarah
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Languages: English
• Product format: Paperback / Softback
• Released: 27.02.2020
• EAN: 9780198858096
• ISBN: 978-0-19-885809-6
• No. of pages: 280
• Subjects: Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Philosophy: general, reference works; Philosophy of Language, PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body, PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology, PHILOSOPHY / Language, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge, Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge