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Armies of Sand addresses why Arab armed forces fared so poorly in battle since the Second World War. It explores four different explanations that scholars, soldiers, and military experts have suggested: Soviet doctrine, politicization, underdevelopment, and culture. To do so, it looks at the performance of over two-dozen Arab militaries from 1948 to 2017, and compares them to a half-dozen non-Arab militaries, to conclude that politics, economics, and culture all contribute to the past weakness of Arab armies. It concludes by addressing circumstances in which Arab military fortunes may shift as both warfare and their societies change.
List of contents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: The Six-Day War and the Mystery of Arab Military Ineffectiveness
- 1. Pattens of Arab Military Performance
- Part I: Soviet Doctrine
- 2. The Soviet Way of War
- 3. Arab Militaries and Soviet Doctrine
- 4. North Korea, Cuba, and Soviet Doctrine
- Part II: Politicization
- 5. Politicization
- 6. Arab Militaries and Politicization: Egypt
- 7. Arab Militaries and Politicization: Iraq
- 8. Politicization and the South Vietnamese Armed Forces
- 9. Politicization and the Argentine Armed Forces
- Part III: Underdevelopment
- 10. Economic Development and Military Effectiveness
- 11. Economic Development and Syrian Military Effectiveness
- 12. Economic Development and the Libya-Chad Wars
- 13. Economic Development and Chinese Military Effectiveness
- 14. Economic Development and Arab Military Effectiveness
- Part IV: Culture
- 15. War and Culture
- 16. Arab Culture as an Explanation for Military Ineffectiveness
- 17. Aab Culture: Patterns and Predilections
- 18. Arab Culture and Arab Military Effectiveness
- 19. Arab Culture and Civilian Organizations
- 20. Culture and Education: The Causal Link
- 21. Arab Military Training Methods
- 22. Exceptional Arab Militaries: State Armed Forces
- 23. Exceptional Arab Militaries: Nonstate Armies
- Conclusions: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness
- Notes
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
About the author
Kenneth M. Pollack was a longtime Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution, where he ran the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and is currently a Resident Scholar of the American Enterprise Institute.
Summary
Since the Second World War, Arab armed forces have consistently punched below their weight. They have lost many wars that by all rights they should have won, and in their best performances only ever achieved quite modest accomplishments. Over time, soldiers, scholars, and military experts have offered various explanations for this pattern. Reliance on Soviet military methods, the poor civil-military relations of the Arab world, the underdevelopment of the Arab states, and patterns of behavior derived from the wider Arab culture, have all been suggested as the ultimate source of Arab military difficulties. In Armies of Sand, Kenneth M. Pollack assesses these differing explanations and isolates the most important causes. Over the course of the book, he examines the combat performance of fifteen Arab armies and air forces in virtually every Middle Eastern war, from the Jordanians and Syrians in 1948 to Hizballah in 2006 and the Iraqis and ISIS in 2014-2017. The book ultimately concludes that reliance on Soviet doctrine was more of a help than a hindrance to the Arabs. In contrast, politicization and underdevelopment were both important factors limiting Arab military effectiveness, but patterns of behavior derived from the dominant Arab culture was the most important factor of all. Pollack closes with a discussion of the rapid changes occurring across the Arab world, and suggests that because both Arab society and warfare are changing, the problems that have bedeviled Arab armed forces in the past could dissipate or even vanish in the future, with potentially dramatic consequences for the Middle East military balance. Sweeping in its coverage, this will be the go-to reference for anyone interested in the history of warfare in the Middle East since 1945.
Additional text
This is a path-breaking volume on an uncomfortable topic: Arab military failure. Kenneth Pollack is the model of the engaged scholar, whose extensive field experience on today's battlefields complements his knowledge of military affairs and the Arab world more broadly. The volume is lucid, comprehensive and fascinating. His conclusions about the relationship between culture and military effectiveness will be controversial, but they are compellingly put and will set the terms of debate for years to come.
