Read more
Written by a noted expert in criminal law, the book explores the philosophical underpinnings of the law's major doctrines concerning actus reus, mens rea, and defences, showing that they are not always driven by culpability. They are grounded also in principles of moral responsibility, ascriptive responsibility, and wrongdoing. As such, they engage wider debates about wrongdoing, and about the boundaries between liability and freedom.
This multi-textured analysis allows the book to take more nuanced positions about many important controversies in criminal law. It argues, for example, that liability for omissions and for negligence-and even some strict liability elements-can sometimes be legitimate yet, at the same time, should be relatively rare. It also explains why principles of causation can differ in the criminal law from other contexts; what is wrong with the 'voluntary act' requirement; and why luck can affect the wrongs we commit without changing our degree of blameworthiness for committing them. The book concludes with an account of the major types of defences, and of how they interact with an agent's wrong and her underlying motivations.
This volume presents a coherent and rich vision of the criminal law that, by its sheer breadth, makes a distinctive contribution to the literature, of interest to lawyers and philosophers alike.
List of contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Part I: Groundwork
- 1: Crime, Responsibility, Culpability, and Wrongdoing
- 2: Structure and Nomenclature
- 3: Five Functions, and Two Kinds, of Mens Rea
- Part II: Responsibility
- 4: Moral and Ascriptive Responsibilities
- 5: Causation
- 6: Why Not-doings are Special
- 7: Complicity
- 8: Moral Responsibility and Voluntariness
- 9: (Non-volitional) Action
- Part III: Culpability and Wrongdoing
- 10: Prolegomenon to Part III
- 11: A Pluralistic Theory of Culpability
- 12: Being Unreasonable
- 13: Strict and Constructive Liability
- 14: Outcome and other Luck
- 15: Distinguishing Intended from Advertent Action
- 16: On the Moral Distinction between Intention and Advertence
- 17: Distinguishing Defences
- 18: Unpacking Justifications
- 19: Unpacking Excuses: Hybrids and Mistakes
About the author
After graduating from Auckland and Oxford, Andrew Simester started his academic career at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. He moved to the National University of Singapore in 2006 and, since 2015, concurrently holds the Edmund-Davies Chair in Criminal Law at King's College London. Professor Simester received an Honorary Doctorate from Uppsala University in 2019, awarded in recognition of his writings in criminal law and theory. He has published widely in these areas, and is also a lead author of two major treatises, Simester and Sullivan's Criminal Law in the UK and Principles of Criminal Law in New Zealand.
Summary
Written by a noted expert in criminal law, the book explores the philosophical underpinnings of the law's major doctrines concerning actus reus, mens rea, and defences, showing that they are not always driven by culpability. They are grounded also in principles of moral responsibility, ascriptive responsibility, and wrongdoing. As such, they engage wider debates about wrongdoing, and about the boundaries between liability and freedom.
This multi-textured analysis allows the book to take more nuanced positions about many important controversies in criminal law. It argues, for example, that liability for omissions and for negligence-and even some strict liability elements-can sometimes be legitimate yet, at the same time, should be relatively rare. It also explains why principles of causation can differ in the criminal law from other contexts; what is wrong with the 'voluntary act' requirement; and why luck can affect the wrongs we commit without changing our degree of blameworthiness for committing them. The book concludes with an account of the major types of defences, and of how they interact with an agent's wrong and her underlying motivations.
This volume presents a coherent and rich vision of the criminal law that, by its sheer breadth, makes a distinctive contribution to the literature, of interest to lawyers and philosophers alike.
Report
Fundamentals of Criminal Law is definitely written for the unashamed criminal law geeks, myself included. It is an in-depth reading and analysis of criminal legal doctrine. In keeping with his interest in theory, Simester seeks to explore the philosophical underpinnings of the criminal legal categories of actus reus, mens rea, and defenses. To a certain extent, the book thus follows a classic structure of criminal law. Penny Crofts, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Books
