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For forty years we've repeatedly reformed the way we run corporations. Yet research suggests these reforms have not only failed but have made many things worse. This book examines how and why modern governance practices fail, especially when advanced as solutions to serious political and social problems.
List of contents
Introduction; 1. Our corporate governance experiment; Part I. What do We Know About Corporate Governance practices: 2. Best practices for boards of director; 3. Can we measure corporate governance; 4. Do we understand executive compensation best practices; 5. What explains shareholder voting; 6. Shareholder activism; 7. Proxy advisors; Part II. What can We Conclude About Our Theories of Corporate Governance: 8. Taking stock of the argument so far: we need a better theory of the firm; 9. How crooked is the timber; 10. Markets and corporate governance; Part III. Are Social Welfare Outcomes any Different: 11. Achieving social and environmental goals through corporate governance; 12. Shareholders and ESG disclosure; 13. Where do we go from here.
About the author
Bryce C. Tingle KC is Professor and N. Murray Edwards Chair in Business Law in the Faculty of Law at the University of Calgary. He is a member of one of the Securities Commissions in Canada, serves as the Chair for various business corporations, and spent decades advising boards, including as the General Counsel of several international corporate groups.
Summary
For forty years we've repeatedly reformed the way we run corporations. Yet research suggests these reforms have not only failed but have made many things worse. This book examines how and why modern governance practices fail, especially when advanced as solutions to serious political and social problems.
Foreword
Examines how and why modern corporate governance practices fail to deliver better economic, managerial, environmental, or social outcomes.
