Minimum Deterrence and Indias Nuclear Security

Informationen zum Autor Rajesh M. Basrur is Director of the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India. He has been a visiting fellow at Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, and the Henry L. Stimson Center. Klappentext In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society. Zusammenfassung In this book, the leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. Basrur shows that the country's nuclear culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence but sometimes drifts into a more open-ended view.

Product details

• Authors: Rajesh Basrur, Rajesh M Basrur, Rajesh M. Basrur
• Publisher: Stanford University Press
• Languages: English
• Product format: Hardback
• Released: 15.11.2005
• EAN: 9780804752558
• ISBN: 978-0-8047-5255-8
• No. of pages: 264
• Dimensions: 159 mm x 235 mm x 19 mm
• Series: Studies in Asian Security; Studies in Asian Security (Har; Studies in Asian Security; Studies in Asian Security (Har
• Subjects: Non-fiction book > History > Miscellaneous; Social sciences, law, business > Political science > Political science and political education