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This book develops and defends the thesis that thinking is a kind of experience, characterized by a sui generis phenomenology, and draws out the implications of this thesis for dominant views in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and metaphysics.
List of contents
- Introduction
- 1: Phenomenal Intentionality
- 2: The Experience of Thinking
- 3: Externalism
- 4: Indexical Thought
- 5: Thinking with Names
- 6: Unconscious Thought
- 7: Conceptual Reference
- Bibliography
About the author
David Pitt received his PhD in philosophy from the City University of New York Graduate Center in 1994. Since 2003 he has been a member of the philosophy department at California State University, Los Angeles. In between he held visiting professorships at Swarthmore College, Hunter College, University of Nebraksa-Lincoln, Brooklyn College, Iowa State University, and Central European University, Budapest, where he was a Fulbright Scholar in 2014-15. He has also held research fellowships at Australian National University, the Institute for Advanced Study at Central European University, and Cambridge University.
Summary
This book develops and defends the thesis that thinking is a kind of experience, characterized by a sui generis phenomenology, and draws out the implications of this thesis for dominant views in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and metaphysics.
Additional text
The phenomenal intentionality of thought thesis in conjunction with an analytic phenomenology constitute the core work of Pitt's innovative response to dominant trends in both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language.
