Imf Lending - Partisanship, Punishment, and Protest

This Element argues that governments seek political advantage during turbulent economic times from IMF programs to protect their supporters.

List of contents

1. Introduction; 2. Theoretical framework; 3. Data; 4. How IMF programs affect distributive politics; 5. How distributive politics under IMF programs affect protest; 6. Discussion and conclusion; References; Appendices.

Summary

This Element argues that governments allocate adjustment burdens strategically to protect their supporters. Using large-N micro-level survey data from three world regions and a global survey, the Element discusses the local political economy of IMF lending. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Foreword

This Element argues that governments seek political advantage during turbulent economic times from IMF programs to protect their supporters.

Product details

• Authors: M. Rodwan Abouharb, M. Rodwan (University College London) Re Abouharb, Rodwan Abouharb, Abouharb M. Rodwan, Bernhard Reinsberg
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press ELT
• Languages: English
• Product format: Hardback
• Released: 31.10.2023
• EAN: 9781009451154
• ISBN: 978-1-0-0945115-4
• No. of pages: 126
• Series: Elements in International Relations
• Subjects: Social sciences, law, business > Business > Economics; POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General, macroeconomics, Political Economy, International institutions