Nature and Normativity of Defeat

Defeat is the loss of justification for believing something in light of new information. This Element mainly aims to work towards developing a novel account of defeat. It distinguishes among three broad views in the epistemology of defeat: scepticism, internalism, and externalism and argues that that sceptical and internalist accounts of defeat are bound to remain unsatisfactory. As a result, any viable account of defeat must be externalist. While there is no shortage of externalist accounts, the Element provides reason to think that extant accounts remain unsatisfactory. The Element also explains the constructive tasks of developing an alternative account of defeat and showing that it improves on the competition.

List of contents

Introduction; 1. Defeat scepticism; 2. Internalist and defeat; 3. Externalism and defeat; 4. Virtue epistemology and internal defeat; 5. Virtue epistemology and external defeat; References.

Summary

This Element aims to work towards developing a novel account of defeat. It distinguishes among three broad views in the epistemology of defeat: scepticism, internalism, and externalism. It argues that that sceptical and internalist accounts of defeat are bound to remain unsatisfactory.

Foreword

This Element develops a novel account of defeat, that is the loss of justification in light of new information.

Product details

• Authors: Christoph Kelp, Christoph (University of Glasgow) Kelp
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press ELT
• Languages: English
• Product format: Paperback / Softback
• Released: 30.09.2023
• EAN: 9781009161039
• ISBN: 978-1-0-0916103-9
• No. of pages: 75
• Series: Elements in Epistemology
• Subjects: Humanities, art, music > Philosophy > General, dictionaries; Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Philosophy: general, reference works; PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body, PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge, Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge