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If we are skeptical about the truth of religious or moral belief, what should we do about those ways of talking and thinking? According to the fictionalist, they provide pragmatic benefits that do not depend on their truth. This volume examines religious fictionalism, moral fictionalism, and the relation between these views.
List of contents
- Introducion
- 1: James Lenman: Reasons for pretending and pretend reasons
- 2: Jessica Isserow: Should moral error theorists make do with make-believe
- 3: Jonas Olson and Victor Moberger: Moral fictionalism: How and why?
- 4: François Jaquet: Moral fictionalism and misleading analogies
- 5: Graham Oppy: Religious fictionalism
- 6: Bradley Armour-Garb and Frederick Kroon: The pretensions of religious fictionalism
- 7: Mary Leng: Is the Pope Catholic? Religious fictionalism and the hazards of belief
- 8: Michael Scott: Religious fictionalism: Strategies and obstacles
- 9: Natalja Deng: The contours of religious fictionalism
- 10: Robin Le Poidevin: Should moral fictionalists be religious fictionalists (or vice versa)?
- 11: Seahwa Kim: Do we have reason to adopt religious fictionalism or moral fictionalism?
- 12: Stuart Brock: Revolutionary moral fictionalism and the problem of imaginative failure
- 13: Richard Joyce: Yes to moral fictionalism; no to religious fictionalism
About the author
Richard Joyce received his PhD from Princeton in 1998. Over the following years he held academic positions at the University of Sheffield, the Australian National University, and the University of Sydney, eventually taking up a professorship at Victoria University of Wellington in 2010. He is the author of Essays in Moral Skepticism (OUP, 2016), The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006), and The Myth of Morality (CUP, 2001). In addition, he has edited several collections and has published numerous journal articles and book chapters, largely in the areas of metaethics and moral psychology.
Stuart Brock is a Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington. He received his PhD from Princeton in 2002, and subsequently taught at Western Washington University. He has published numerous journal articles and book chapters on fiction and fictionalism. He is co-author of A Critical Introduction to Fictionalism (Bloomsbury, 2018) and Realism and Antirealism (Routledge, 2007) and co-editor of Fictional Objects (OUP, 2015).
Summary
If we are skeptical about the truth of religious or moral belief, what should we do about those ways of talking and thinking? According to the fictionalist, they provide pragmatic benefits that do not depend on their truth. This volume examines religious fictionalism, moral fictionalism, and the relation between these views.
