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List of contents
Contents Preface (by Noel O'Sullivan) Chapter 1: Introduction PART 1 Chapter 2: Relativism Introduction How to Justify Relativism David Wong's Conception of Moral Relativity Harman and Relativism -- Relativity as Reasonably Required Rorty's Relativism Conclusion Chapter 3: Universalism Introduction Thomas Nagel's Universalism Habermas' Transcendental-Pragmatic Argument The Universalism of Stuart Hampshire Contingent Universalism Conclusion Chapter 4: Reflective Equilibrium and Relativism Introduction Reflective Equilibrium as a Method of Moral Justification 'Considered' Judgements The Status of Considered Moral Judgements The Nature of Coherence Relativism How We Choose Between Multiple Justified Moralities Conclusion -- Coherence Relativism? Chapter 5: Coherence Relativism and Its Implications Introduction Universality and Moral Criticism Abhorrent Moralities, Relativism and Toleration Conclusion PART 2 Chapter 6: Liberal Neutrality Introduction Charles Larmore's Neutralist Proposal Rawls' Priority of Right Conclusion Chapter 7: Reasonable Disagreement and Relativism Introduction Reasonable Disagreement and Liberalism Liberalism, Scepticism and Relativism Relativism and Justificatory Liberalism Justificatory Liberalism and the Possibility of Legitimacy Conclusion Chapter 8: Conclusion The Culture of Relativism Bibliography Index
About the author
Moral relativism is often regarded as incompatible with liberalism. This book aims to show why such criticism is misconceived. First, it argues that relativism provides a plausible account of moral justification. Drawing on the contemporary relativist and universalist analyses of Harman, Nagel and Habermas, it develops an alternative account of 'coherence relativism' and argues that the political liberalism of Rawls and Barry is founded on an unacknowledged commitment to a relativist account of justification. The thesis on which this book is based won the 2003 Sir Ernest Barker prize from the Political Studies Association.
