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Using detailed case studies of Egypt and Tunisia, and drawing on over 140 interviews with civilian and military leaders and three surveys of military personnel, this scholarly volume examines why some militaries support and others thwart transitions to democracy.
List of contents
- 1: Introduction
- 2: A Theory of Military Behavior
- 3: Cross-National Analysis
- 4: Case Selection: Egypt and Tunisia
- 5: Egypt: Empowering the Military
- 6: Egypt: Repression and Revolution
- 7: Egypt: A Coup against Democracy
- 8: Tunisia: Marginalizing the Military
- 9: Tunisia: Shirking in the Revolution
- 10: Tunisia: Supporting the Transition
- 11: Tunisia: Facilitating the Takeover
- 12: Surveying the Military
- 13: Conclusion
- Bibliography
About the author
Sharan Grewal is an Assistant Professor of Government at William & Mary, a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Project on Middle East Democracy. His research has been published in the American Political Science Review and the American Journal of Political Science, among other outlets, and has received funding from the National Science Foundation, the Henry Luce Foundation, the John Templeton Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation.
Summary
Why do some militaries support and others thwart transitions to democracy? After the Arab Spring revolutions, why did Egypt's military stage a coup to end the transition? Conversely, why did Tunisia's military initially support the transition, only to later facilitate the elected president's dismantling of democracy?
In Soldiers of Democracy? Military Legacies and the Arab Spring, Sharan Grewal argues that a military's behavior under democracy is shaped by how it had been treated under autocracy. Autocrats who had empowered their militaries produce soldiers who will repress protests and stage coups to preserve their privileges. Meanwhile, autocrats who had marginalized their militaries produce soldiers who support democratization, but who are also more susceptible to incumbent takeovers and civil wars. The dictator's choice to either empower or marginalize the military thus creates legacies that shape both the likelihood of democratization and the forms by which it breaks down.
Drawing on over 140 interviews with civilian and military leaders, and three surveys of military personnel, this scholarly volume illustrates this theory through detailed case studies of Egypt and Tunisia. Grewal also probes the generalizability of the theory through a cross-national analysis of all countries between 1946-2010. Overall, he brings the military front and center to the study of democratic transition and consolidation.
Additional text
The book is a valuable resource for those interested in examining democratic transitions, civil-military relations, and social movements.
