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Evolutionary game theory originated in population biology from the realisation that frequency-dependent fitness introduced a strategic element into evolution. Since its development, evolutionary game theory has been adopted by many social scientists, and philosophers, to analyse interdependent decision problems played by boundedly rational individuals. Its study has led to theoretical innovations of great interest for the biological and social sciences. For example, theorists have developed a number of dynamical models which can be used to study how populations of interacting individuals change their behaviours over time. In this introduction, this Element covers the two main approaches to evolutionary game theory: the static analysis of evolutionary stability concepts, and the study of dynamical models, their convergence behaviour and rest points. This Element also explores the many fascinating, and complex, connections between the two approaches.
List of contents
1. Introduction; 2. Evolutionarily stable strategies; 3. Continuous dynamical models; 4. Finite population models; 5. Conclusion; Bibliography.
Summary
This Element covers the two main approaches to evolutionary game theory: the static analysis of evolutionary stability concepts, and the study of dynamical models, their convergence behaviour and rest points. The Element also explores the many fascinating, and complex, connections between the two approaches.
Foreword
This Element models the dynamics of boundedly rational agents in strategic settings, showing how behaviours emerge, change, and stabilise.
