Read more
In
Leveraging Latency, Tristan A. Volpe explores how weak nations compel concessions from superpowers by threatening to acquire atomic weapons. Volpe finds that there is a trade-off between threatening proliferation and promising nuclear restraint. States need just enough bomb-making capacity to threaten proliferation, but not so much that it becomes too difficult for them to offer nonproliferation assurances. Including four comparative case studies and identifying a generalizable mechanism--the threat-assurance tradeoff--Volpe provides a systematic assessment of the coercive utility of nuclear technology.
List of contents
- Chapter 1: Introduction
- Chapter 2: A Theory of Compellence with Nuclear Latency
- Chapter 3: Japan
- Chapter 4: West Germany
- Chapter 5: North Korea
- Chapter 6: Iran
- Chapter 7: Conclusion
- Notes
- References
- Index
About the author
Tristan A. Volpe is Assistant Professor in the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. He is also a Nonresident Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Summary
Over the last seven decades, some states successfully leveraged the threat of acquiring atomic weapons to compel concessions from superpowers. For many others, however, this coercive gambit failed to work. When does nuclear latency--the technical capacity to build the bomb--enable states to pursue effective coercion?
In Leveraging Latency, Tristan A. Volpe argues that having greater capacity to build weaponry doesn't translate to greater coercive advantage. Volpe finds that there is a trade-off between threatening proliferation and promising nuclear restraint. States need just enough bomb-making capacity to threaten proliferation, but not so much that it becomes too difficult for them to offer nonproliferation assurances. The boundaries of this sweet spot align with the capacity to produce the fissile material at the heart of an atomic weapon.
To test this argument, Volpe includes comparative case studies of four countries that leveraged latency against superpowers: Japan, West Germany, North Korea, and Iran. In doing so, Volpe identifies a generalizable mechanism--the threat-assurance trade-off--that explains why more power often makes compellence less likely to work. This framework illuminates how technology shapes broader bargaining dynamics and helps to refine policy options for inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. As nuclear technology continues to cast a shadow over the global landscape, Leveraging Latency provides a systematic assessment of its coercive utility.
Additional text
Leveraging Latency reminds us that even hypothetical military capabilities can be used as bargaining power. But as Volpe elegantly explains, countries must perform a delicate balancing act to extract real concessions from military potential. His rich case studies illuminate the strategic logic of nuclear latency, revealing the hidden dilemmas and tradeoffs of bargaining over nuclear programs. Students of coercive diplomacy and nuclear proliferation will find this book indispensable.
