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In this book, James H. Lebovic argues that the policy approach to maintain nuclear superiority did not make sense during the Cold War and makes even less sense now. As he shows, the idea that nuclear superiority is an imperative still serves as the foundation for too much strategic policy in an era where utility of such weapons is highly questionable. Moreover, continuing to rely on them as coercive tools rests on deficient logic and is dangerous. Not only explaining why we remain stuck with a nuclear stance that is largely irrelevant to the era, this book also offers a way out of the type of thinking that keeps such policies in place.
List of contents
- Concepts and Arguments
- Chapter 1: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War
- SECTION I: Assessing Nuclear Capability: The History and Implications of Alleged Nuclear Advantages
- Chapter 2: The Cold War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry
- Chapter 3: Nuclear "Superiority" after the Cold War
- SECTION II: Coercive Tactics: Boosting Credibility to Signal a US Willingness to Act on the US "Nuclear Advantage"
- Chapter 4: Commitment
- Chapter 5: Risk Manipulation
- Chapter 6: Resolve and Reputation
- SECTION III: Case Studies
- Chapter 7: When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis
- Chapter 8: When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Conclusions
- Chapter 9: The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence
- Notes
- Index
About the author
James H. Lebovic is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. He has published widely on defense policy, deterrence strategy, arms control, military budgets and procurement, foreign aid, democracy and human rights, international organizations, international conflict and cooperation, and military intervention. He previously authored six books including Planning to Fail: The US War in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Oxford, 2019), Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama (2013), The Limits of US Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq (2010), and Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11 ( 2007). From 2015-2017, he chaired the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association.
Summary
This political analysis exposes the fanciful logic that the United States can use nuclear weapons to vanquish nuclear adversaries or influence them when employing various coercive tactics.
During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect.
Additional text
The False Promise of Superiority is an important book that reminds readers how the faulty logics and irrationalities of the Cold War era continue to haunt the present.
