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Zusatztext '...a useful contribution for researchers interested in issues of migration from developing to developed countries.' - Silke Uebelmesser! Journal of Economics (springer Wien) Informationen zum Autor CHISATO YOSHIDA is Associate Professor of International Economics at Ritsumeikan University, Japan. He obtained his PhD in 1999 from Okayama University and has previously held a position at Okayama University, Japan. His research interests focus on illegal immigration, foreign direct investment and uncertainty. He is the author of Illegal Immigration and Economic Welfare . ALAN D. WOODLAND is Professor of Econometrics in the School of Economics and Political Science at the University of Sydney, Australia. He completed his PhD at the University of New England and has previously held positions at the University of New England, USA and the University of British Columbia, Canada. He is the author of International Trade and Resource Allocation , a co-editor of International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim and editor of Economic Theory and International Trade . Klappentext This book is an extensive review of the current state of illegal immigration in Europe and North America whilst providing theoretical analysis. This analysis models illegal immigration in a two-country framework, highlights the inter-related labour markets and considers a range of immigration policy instruments, including border patrols and employer surveillance and sanctions. Distinguishing between scenarios with and without the international mobility of capital, this book also examines various profit sharing arrangements. Other issues explored include: - The effectiveness of tighter border patrols and internal surveillance upon the level of illegal immigration - The effects upon national and international welfare - And optimal immigration policy choices Zusammenfassung This book is an extensive review of the current state of illegal immigration in Europe and North America whilst providing theoretical analysis. This analysis models illegal immigration in a two-country framework, highlights the inter-related labour markets and considers a range of immigration policy instruments, including border patrols and employer surveillance and sanctions. Distinguishing between scenarios with and without the international mobility of capital, this book also examines various profit sharing arrangements. Other issues explored include: - The effectiveness of tighter border patrols and internal surveillance upon the level of illegal immigration - The effects upon national and international welfare - And optimal immigration policy choices Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction PART I: THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION The Global Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration in the Absence of Capital Mobility The Global Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration in the Presence of Capital Mobility The Welfare Effects of Border Patrol on Illegal Immigration The Welfare Effects of Financing the Internal Enforcement of Illegal Immigration Final Conclusion PART II: THE OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS The Optimal Enforcement of Immigration Law The Optimal Enforcement of a Finance-Constrained Immigration Law Final Conclusion PART III: THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF A PROFIT-SHARING POLICY Unemployment, International Migration and Profit-Sharing International Migration, Profit-Sharing and National Welfare Can a Profit-Sharing Scheme Remedy Large Scale Unemployment in a Less Developed Country?...
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Introduction PART I: THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION The Global Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration in the Absence of Capital Mobility The Global Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration in the Presence of Capital Mobility The Welfare Effects of Border Patrol on Illegal Immigration The Welfare Effects of Financing the Internal Enforcement of Illegal Immigration Final Conclusion PART II: THE OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS The Optimal Enforcement of Immigration Law The Optimal Enforcement of a Finance-Constrained Immigration Law Final Conclusion PART III: THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF A PROFIT-SHARING POLICY Unemployment, International Migration and Profit-Sharing International Migration, Profit-Sharing and National Welfare Can a Profit-Sharing Scheme Remedy Large Scale Unemployment in a Less Developed Country?
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'...a useful contribution for researchers interested in issues of migration from developing to developed countries.' - Silke Uebelmesser, Journal of Economics (springer Wien)
