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In
Dictatorship and Information, Martin K. Dimitrov offers a systematic theory of the institutional solutions to the dictator's dilemma, which arises from the incapacity to calibrate repression and concessions due to distorted information about elite and popular discontent. Dimitrov argues that communist regimes are especially adept at developing sophisticated systems that mobilize the party, State Security, and internal journalism to assess levels of dissent. Drawing from a rich base of evidence across multiple communist regimes and nearly 100 interviews, Dimitrov reshapes our understanding of how autocrats learn--or fail to learn--about the societies they rule, and how they maintain--or lose--power.
List of contents
- List of Figures and Maps
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- Part I. Theory and Method
- 1. Introduction: Solving the Dictator's Dilemma
- 2. Studying Government Perceptions of Popular Discontent in Autocracies
- Part II. Parallel Origins of Communist Information States
- 3. Monitoring and Counteracting Dissent in Bulgaria, 1944-1958
- 4. Monitoring and Counteracting Dissent in China, 1949-1958
- Part III. Divergent Evolution of Communist Information States
- 5. Bread and Circuses: Consumption and Stability in Bulgaria, 1959-1988
- 6. Continuity and Change: Information Gathering in China, 1959-1988
- Part IV. Similar Crises, Varied Contexts, Different Reforms
- 7. Information-Gathering Institutions in Bulgaria, 1989-1991
- 8. Information-Gathering Institutions in China, 1989-2019
- Part V. Generalizability of the Theory
- 9. Scope Conditions: Authoritarian Information-Gathering Institutions
- 10. Conclusion: Information and Authoritarian Regime Resilience
- Index
About the author
Martin K. Dimitrov is Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. His books include Piracy and the State: The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China; Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe; and The Political Logic of Socialist Consumption.
Summary
Fear pervades dictatorial regimes. Citizens fear leaders, the regime's agents fear superiors, and leaders fear the masses. The ubiquity of fear in such regimes gives rise to the "dictator's dilemma," where autocrats do not know the level of opposition they face and cannot effectively neutralize domestic threats to their rule. The dilemma has led scholars to believe that autocracies are likely to be short-lived.
Yet, some autocracies have found ways to mitigate the dictator's dilemma. As Martin K. Dimitrov shows in Dictatorship and Information, substantial variability exists in the survival of nondemocratic regimes, with single-party polities having the longest average duration. Offering a systematic theory of the institutional solutions to the dictator's dilemma, Dimitrov argues that single-party autocracies have fostered channels that allow for the confidential vertical transmission of information, while also solving the problems associated with distorted information.
To explain how this all works, Dimitrov focuses on communist regimes, which have the longest average lifespan among single-party autocracies and have developed the most sophisticated information-gathering institutions. Communist regimes face a variety of threats, but the main one is the masses. Dimitrov therefore examines the origins, evolution, and internal logic of the information-collection ecosystem established by communist states to monitor popular dissent. Drawing from a rich base of evidence across multiple communist regimes and nearly 100 interviews, Dimitrov reshapes our understanding of how autocrats learn--or fail to learn--about the societies they rule, and how they maintain--or lose--power.
Additional text
Dimitrov's book is a major contribution both in presenting original theory and data, and in deepening our understanding of how authoritarian leaders manage their population. It should be read widely by students of authoritarianism.
