The Myth of Democratic Failure - Why Political Institutions Are Efficient

In The Myth of Democratic Failure, Donald A. Wittman refutes one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economic markets are more efficient than the processes and institutions of democratic government.

List of contents

Acknowledgments 1: Introduction: The Market Metaphor 2: The Informed Voter 3: Electoral-Market Competition and the Control of Opportunistic Behavior 4: Transaction Costs and the Design of Government institutions 5: Homo Economicus versus Homo Psychologicus: Why Cognitive Psychology Does Not Explain Democratic Politics 6: Legislative Markets and Organization 7: Pressure Groups 8: Bureaucratic Markets: Why Government Bureaucracies Are Efficient and Not Too Large 9: The Market for Regulation 10: The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract and the Role of Transaction Costs in Constitutional Design 11: Majority Rule and Preference Aggregation 12: The Distribution of Economic Wealth and Political Power 13: The Testing of Theory 14: Epilogue: The Burden of Proof References Author Index Subject index

Summary

A text seeking to refute one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economic markets are more efficient than the processes and institutions of democratic government.

Product details

• Authors: Donald A. Wittman, Donald A. (University of California at Santa Cruz) Wittman
• Publisher: University Of Chicago Press
• Languages: English
• Product format: Paperback / Softback
• Released: 01.01.1997
• EAN: 9780226904238
• ISBN: 978-0-226-90423-8
• No. of pages: 240
• Dimensions: 224 mm x 154 mm x 15 mm
• Weight: 358 g
• Series: American Politics & Political; American Politics & Political Economy S.; American Politics/Political Economy Series Appe (CHUP); American Politics and Political Economy Series
• Subject: Social sciences, law, business > Business > General, dictionaries