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Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense? Endre Begby argues that it is a mistake to think of prejudice as the result of epistemic irresponsibility: prejudiced belief is often epistemically justified. Avoiding harmful prejudice is a matter of ethical responsibility not epistemic responsibility.
List of contents
- Preface
- 1: Prejudice from an epistemological point of view
- 2: The psychology of stereotypes
- 3: From psychology to philosophy: the case for non-ideal epistemology
- 4: The epistemology of prejudice acquisition
- 5: The epistemology of prejudice maintenance
- 6: Evidential preemption
- 7: Common ground: the peculiar epistemology of culturally normal belief
- 8: Automated risk assessment in the criminal justice process: a case of algorithmic bias ?
- 9: Moral constraints on belief?
- 10: A better approach: moral responsibility despite epistemic blamelessness
- References
About the author
Endre Begby received his MA degree from the University of Oslo and his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. He is currently an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Simon Fraser University. His areas of specialization include epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, as well as social and political philosophy.
Summary
Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense? Endre Begby argues that it is a mistake to think of prejudice as the result of epistemic irresponsibility: prejudiced belief is often epistemically justified. Avoiding harmful prejudice is a matter of ethical responsibility not epistemic responsibility.
Additional text
The book does an excellent job motivating inquiry into what a system of epistemic norms for agents with our specific cognitive and situational limitations would look like.
