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Informationen zum Autor Susan L. Shirk is Professor of Political Science at the University of California! San Diego! and the author of Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China (California! 1982). Klappentext In the past decade! China was able to carry out economic reform without political reform! while the Soviet Union attempted the opposite strategy. How did China succeed at economic market reform without changing communist rule? Susan Shirk shows that Chinese communist political institutions are more flexible and less centralized than their Soviet counterparts were. Shirk pioneers a rational choice institutional approach to analyze policy-making in a non-democratic authoritarian country and to explain the history of Chinese market reforms from 1979 to the present. Drawing on extensive interviews with high-level Chinese officials! she pieces together detailed histories of economic reform policy decisions and shows how the political logic of Chinese communist institutions shaped those decisions. Combining theoretical ambition with the flavor of on-the-ground policy-making in Beijing! this book is a major contribution to the study of reform in China and other communist countries. Zusammenfassung This study analyzes policy-making in a non-democratic authoritarian country, explaining the history of Chinese market reforms from 1979 to the present. Drawing on interviews with high-level Chinese officials, it pieces together detailed histories of economic reform policy decisions. Inhaltsverzeichnis Acknowledgments Formal Authority Relations Among Central Communist Party and Government Institutions in the People's Republic of China PART 1. INTRODUCTION 1. The Political Logic of Economic Reform 2. The Prereform Chinese Economy and the Decision to Initiate Market Reforms PART 2. CHINESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 3. Authority Relations: The Communist Party and the Government 4. Leadership Incentives:- Political Succession and Reciprocal Accountability 5. Bargaining Arena: The Government Bureaucracy 6. Who Is Enfranchised in the Policy-making Process? 7. Decision Rules: Delegation by Consensus 8. Chinese Political Institutions and the Path of Economic Reforms PART 3· ECONOMIC REFORM POLICY-MAKING 9. Playing to the Provinces: Fiscal Decentralization and the Politics of Reform 10. Creating Vested Interests in Reform: Industrial Reform Takeoff! 1978-81 11. Leadership Succession and Policy Conflict: The Choice Between Profit Contracting and Substituting Tax-for-Profit! 1982-83 221 12. Building Bureaucratic Consensus: Formulating the Tax-for-Profit Policy! 1983-84 13. The Power of Particularism: Abortive Price Reform and the Revival of Profit Contracting! 1985-88 PART 4· CONCLUSION 14. The Political Lessons of Economic Reform in China Bibliography Index ...
