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A book for readers interested in the latest theories about knowledge and rational belief, with an emphasis on how outright belief relates to degrees of certainty. The most straightforward connection between those has given rise to a paradox, which is central to all of the essays in this volume.
List of contents
Introduction Igor Douven; 1. Rational belief and statistical evidence: blame, bias, and the law Dana Nelkin; 2. Knowledge attributions and lottery cases: a review and new evidence John Turri; 3. The psychological dimension of the lottery paradox Jennifer Nagel; 4. Three puzzles about lotteries Julia Staffel; 5. Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified Martin Smith; 6. Rethinking the lottery paradox: a dual processing perspective Igor Douven and Shira Elqayam; 7. Rational belief in lottery- and preface-situations: impossibility results and possible solutions Gerhard Schurz; 8. Stability and the lottery paradox Hannes Leitgeb; 9. The lottery, the preface and epistemic rule consequentialism Christoph Kelp and Francesco Praolini; 10. Beliefs, probabilities, and their coherent correspondence Kevin Kelly and Hanti Lin; 11. The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: a general impossibility theorem Franz Dietrich and Christian List; Bibliography; Index.
About the author
Igor Douven is a CNRS Research Professor at Paris-Sorbonne University. His essays have appeared in numerous major philosophy and cognitive science journals, and he is the author of The Epistemology of Indicative Conditionals (Cambridge, 2016).
Summary
A book for readers interested in the latest theories about knowledge and rational belief, with an emphasis on how outright belief relates to degrees of certainty. The most straightforward connection between those has given rise to a paradox, which is central to all of the essays in this volume.
Foreword
The book offers new insights into the lottery paradox, and thereby into how categorical and graded beliefs are formally connected.
