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'With courage, honesty and insight, John Lough navigates one of the most sensitive areas of global politics today and sees a crucial role for Germany in creating a transformative environment around Russia that can facilitate its return to Europe.'
>'With admirable clarity, fairness and insight, Lough lays bare the roots and results of Germany's failure to think strategically about Russia, and the price that everyone else pays as a result.'
>'John Lough's book is nuanced, astute and fair. That makes his account of how hope keeps triumphing over experience in Germany's Russia policy all the more devastating.'
>Germany has the most developed relationship with Russia of any EU country, spanning business, education, politics, culture and sport. But Germany has a Russia problem: its policymakers struggle to accept that Moscow's efforts to rebalance Europe are an attack on Germany's interests. Any conflict with Russia is deeply discomforting, and arouses emotions that impede clear thinking and consistent action.
In this bold and original analysis, John Lough explains the scale of the challenge facing Germany as it strives to design policies for managing its relations with a changing Russia. Beginning with an account of how the countries' attitudes to each other were formed over several centuries, he proceeds to explore how German governments from 1991 to 2014 misread Russian intentions and inadvertently supported the emergence of a Russian system hostile to German interests, until Angela Merkel sharply recalibrated German and EU policy. The book looks at the role of German business interests and Germany's vulnerability to Russian interference, including misinformation and cyber attacks. It concludes by considering how Germany can strengthen its position against Russian influence in the future.
About the author
John Lough is an Associate Fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House (since 2009) and a regular commentator on Russian and Ukrainian affairs. He spent six years with NATO managing information programmes aimed at Central and Eastern Europe, including a posting to Moscow, where he set up NATO's Information Office in Russia and was the first Alliance official to be permanently based in the country. He runs his own consultancy business, advising clients on political and investment risk in Russia, Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Union. He studied German and Russian literature at Cambridge University.
Summary
The relationship between Germany and Russia is Europe’s most important link with the largest country on the continent. This book analyses how successive German governments from 1991 to 2014 have misread Russian intentions, until Angela Merkel sharply recalibrated German and EU policy towards Moscow. -- .
