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Through a close analysis of key cases, Keck examines the impact that acquiring nuclear arsenals had after US allies developed them. By examining existing and recently declassified documents, original archival research, and interviews with US officials, this important study challenges conventional wisdom on Washington’s nuclear containment strategy.
List of contents
Acknowledgements
Foreword by Graham T. Allison
Chapter 1: Introduction
Part I: Allies
Chapter 2: The Ultimate Betrayal (Britain, 1939-1946)
Chapter 3: Stuck in the Mud (Britain, 1947-1955)
Chapter 4: Full Cooperation at Last (Britain, 1956-1962)
Chapter 5: A Bomb is Born (France, 1945-1960)
Chapter 6: The General's Bomb (France, 1961-1975)
Part II: Partners
Chapter 7: A Nuclear Cat and Mouse (Israel, 1950s-1963)
Chapter 8: The Bomb Which Shall Not Be Named (Israel, 1963-1979)
Chapter 9: The Bomb from Hell (Pakistan, 1973-1990)
Chapter 10: Pandora's Box (Pakistan, 1990-Present)
Chapter 11: Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
About the Author
About the author
Zachary Keck has worked on nuclear issues across government, think tanks, and media. In Congress, he was a Professional Staff Member for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, including for the Subcommittee on Nonproliferation. Keck has also worked as a researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He began his career in media, working as the Managing Editor of The Diplomat and The National Interest. Keck has published over 1,000 articles including in the Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic, CNN.com, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. You can find him on Twitter: @ZacharyKeck.
