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In an increasingly complex and interdependent world, states resort to a bewildering array of regulatory agreements to deal with problems as disparate as climate change, nuclear proliferation, international trade, satellite communications, species destruction, and intellectual property. In such a system, there must be some means of ensuring reasonably reliable performance of treaty obligations. The standard approach to this problem, taken by academics and politicians alike, is to search for treaties with "teeth" - military or economic sanctions to deter and punish violation. The New Sovereignty argues that this approach is misconceived. Cases of coercive enforcement are rare, and sanctions are too costly and difficult to mobilize to be a reliable enforcement tool. As an alternative to this "enforcement" model, the authors propose a "managerial" model for ensuring treaty compliance. It relies on the elaboration and application of treaty norms in a continuing dialogue among the parties, international officials, and nongovernmental organizations - and it is this dialogue that generates pressure to resolve problems of noncompliance. In the process, the norms and practices of the regime themselves evolve and develop.
List of contents
A theory of compliance. Part 1 Sanctions: treaty-based military and economic sanctions; membership sanctions; unilateral sanctions. Part 2 Toward a strategy for managing compliance: norms; transparency, norms and strategic interaction; reporting and data collection; verification and monitoring; instruments of active management; policy review and assessment; nongovernmental organizations; revitalizing international organizations.
About the author
Abram Chayes is Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School.Antonia Handler Chayes is Director and Senior Advisor, Conflict Management Group. She is a former undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force.
Summary
States resort to regulatory agreements to address problems as disparate as nuclear proliferation, international trade, species destruction, and intellectual property, while threatening military or economic sanctions in order to deter noncompliance. This book argues that this approach is misconceived, and proposes a new model of treaty compliance.
