Fr. 116.00

Institutionalizing Violence - Strategies of Jihad in Egypt

English · Hardback

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Through a detailed focus on two of the most influential Egyptian jihadi groups -- al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad -- Institutionalizing Violence shows why some groups choose the path of ordinary politics and others choose violent extremism. Both groups began in the 1970s, but Jama'a al-Islamiyya eventually allied with the Muslim Brotherhood and engaged in mass-movement politics. Islamic Jihad remained sectarian and highly radical, eventually merging with al Qaeda. Addressing why ideologically similar organizations follow such different paths, Jerome Drevon shows that such splits are characteristic across the region, where once-allied jihadi groups in similar circumstances eventually followed substantially different trajectories.

List of contents










  • Table of Contents

  • Acknowledgements

  • List of Illustrations

  • List of Abbreviations

  • Arabic Glossary

  • Arabic Transliteration

  • CHAPTER 1 Introduction

  • 1.1. How Important are Jihadi Groups' Strategic Developments?

  • 1.2. Jihad and its Aftermath in Egypt

  • 1.3. The Concepts of Radicalization and Institutionalization

  • 1.4. The First Argument: Jihadi Groups' Radicalization and Institutionalization

  • 1.5. The Second Argument: Jihadi Groups' Institutionalization and Long-Term Strategic Evolution

  • 1.6. The Scope of the Model and Contribution to Existing Research

  • 1.7. Overview of the Chapters

  • CHAPTER 2 Institutionalizing Violence

  • 2.1. Jihadi Groups' Relational Radicalization

  • 2.2. Comparative Mechanisms of Radicalization and Beyond

  • 2.3. Jihadi Groups' Institutionalization

  • 2.4. Radicalization and Institutionalization

  • 2.5. Institutionalization and Long-Term Strategic Evolution

  • CHAPTER 3 Two Trajectories to Jihad


  • 3.1. The Seeds of Violence Before and After Nasser's Free Officers

  • 3.2. Religion and Politics Under Sadat

  • 3.3. Covert Jihad Group Mobilization

  • 3.4. From Mass Movement Proselytization to Jihad

  • 3.5. Towards an Armed Confrontation: Killing Pharaoh

  • 3.6. Conclusion

  • CHAPTER 4 Strategy Institutionalization

  • 4.1. Cementing the Roots of Salafi Jihadi Opposition to the Regime in Prison

  • 4.2. Early Institutionalization after Sadat's Assassination Trials

  • 4.3. Denouncing Other Islamists and Religious Institutions

  • 4.4. A Contentious Exile to Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Cradle of al-Qaeda

  • 4.5. Ideological Radicalization in Exile?

  • 4.6. A Strategic Deadlock and the Transnationalization of Jihad

  • 4.7. Reinterpreting Salafi Jihadi Ideology

  • 4.8. Conclusion

  • CHAPTER 5 Confronting the Regime and Fighting the Far Enemy

  • 5.1. Reacting to Repression

  • 5.2. The Militarization of the Conflict

  • 5.3. A Fight for Survival

  • 5.4. Relocating Jihad Abroad

  • 5.5. Conclusion

  • CHAPTER 6 The Emergence of Non-Violent Political Alternatives

  • 6.1. What Happened to the Other Islamists?

  • 6.2. The Institutionalization of Jihadi Groups' Collective Identities

  • 6.3. Responding to a Short-Lived Democratization

  • 6.4. Conclusion

  • CHAPTER 7 Conclusion

  • 7.1. The Institutional Trajectories of the Islamic and Jihad Groups

  • 7.2. Armed Violence Beyond Egypt

  • 7.2.1. The Strategic Development of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State

  • 7.2.2. Political Violence and Democracy

  • 7.2.2. The Role of Ideas

  • 7.3. Understanding Jihadi Groups as Groups

  • Annex: Methodology and Field Research

  • Bibliography



About the author

Jérôme Drevon is senior analyst on Jihad and Modern Conflict at the International Crisis Group (ICG) and research associate at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) (Centre on Conflict, Development & Peacebuilding (CCDP)). He was previously advisor for Non-State Armed Groups at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Jerome has undertaken extensive field research and interviews with salafi jihadi militants in Egypt and Syria.

Summary

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

The Egyptian al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad have shaped the trajectory of jihadi salafism since its inception and defined a key strategic divide between mass-movement mobilization and elitist avant-gardism. Despite their shared histories, however, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya rejected al-Qaeda's transnational violence and became a political party after 2011, whereas Islamic Jihad has formed the backbone of Osama bin Laden's organization.

These strategic divergences are puzzling since these groups emerged in the same country around congruent ideologies. Institutionalizing Violience develops an institutional approach to radicalization to compare the two groups' comparative trajectories. It is based on extensive field research conducted with their leaders and members in Egypt. The interviews provide a unique perspective on how jihadi groups make and implement new strategic decisions in changing environments, as well as the evolution of their approaches to violence and non-violence.

Additional text

In his remarkable book, Drevon (Geneva Graduate Institute, Switzerland) advances a well-grounded theoretical understanding of the radicalization and de-radicalization of Salafi groups and the centrality of institutionalization to the groups' strategic choices. Drevon's excellent book draws on unique materials gathered through extensive, in-country research in Egypt, which convincingly shows how different types of jihadist organizational patterns influence the trajectories of the groups, including their chances for conflict termination and political accommodation. This richly researched project is excellent scholarship because of the exceptional access Drevon had to historical figures in Egypt's most influential jihadist groups, which provides unique insight into strategic decision-making within militant organizations.

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