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Drawing on twenty years of research and observations, Li explains how bribery and corruption are carried out in countries with weak institutional environments, and how these activities become globalized. By distinguishing rule-based, relation-based and clan-based governance, this book offers a novel explanation to the age-old puzzle of why some countries thrive despite corruption. It also sheds lights on the symbiotic roles corruption and anticorruption campaigns play in maintaining dictatorships. Applying cost-benefit analysis to different governance environments, Li argues that as non-rule-based economies expand, the transition from relying on private relationships to relying on public rules is inevitable. However, by highlighting the globalization of corruption by non-rule-based countries, this book warns against the potential threats and consequences of bribery by powerful dictatorial governments. This book will appeal to scholars, analysts and graduate students studying corruption, as well as policymakers, business professionals and executives seeking insights into the characteristics of bribery and corruption within different institutional settings.
List of contents
Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction: why study corruption in countries with weak institutional environments?; 2. Bribe takers: types of corruption and their effects on efficiency; 3. Bribe payers: why do people pay? What do they get? Can they refuse to pay?; 4. When public rules meet private relations: the importance of governance environment; 5. Why some societies thrive despite corruption: a relation-based explanation; 6. Corruption and anticorruption: two legs supporting dictatorships; 7. Paths to transition away from corruption; 8. The globalization of corruption by countries with weak institutional environments; 9. Conclusion: challenges and hopes in fighting corruption globally; References; Index.
About the author
Shaomin Li is Eminent Scholar and Professor of International Business at Old Dominion University, Virginia. He has published in the Journal of International Business Studies, Harvard Business Review, and The Wall Street Journal, amongst others. In 2008 the Governor of Virginia presented him the Outstanding Faculty Award.
Summary
Drawing on twenty years of research and observations on bribery and corruption in countries with weak institutional environments, Li offers a novel explanation to the age-old puzzle of why some countries thrive despite corruption. For scholars and analysts studying corruption, as well as policymakers, business professionals and executives.
Foreword
Drawing on global empirical evidence, Li offers a novel explanation to the age-old puzzle of why some countries thrive despite corruption.
Additional text
'Using a comparative approach, Li provides a new and insightful analysis of why corruption flourishes in states with weak institutions, how different forms of corruption can differentially impact a state's economic development, and why corruption is widespread despite efforts to control it.' Andy Wedeman, Georgia State University
