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"Corruption - commonly defined as the misuse of public office for private gain - constitutes a serious, even existential challenge for many governments around the world. When officials and bureaucrats embezzle public funds or take bribes in exchange for favors, governance is weakened and everything from public goods provision to infrastructure projects to military readiness may be impacted. Corruption undermines economies in numerous ways, including by creating resource misallocation, raising transaction costs among economic actors, and disincentivizing public and private investments. Although corruption can sometimes help cut through regulations and "grease the wheels" of economic development, the consensus in corruption studies remains that in the long-run it is nearly always detrimental to growth. In part because of its negative effects on government and the economy, but also because of its inherent unjustness, corruption is a major cause of public discontent and unrest"--
List of contents
1. Introduction; 2. Theory and Methodology; 3. How the Kuomintang Cleaned House in Taiwan; 4. Corruption Control in Authoritarian South Korea; 5. The Chinese Communist Party's War Against Corruption, 1921-90; 6. Xi Jinping's Campaign and the End of Political Liberalization; 7. Anti-Corruption Efforts Around the Authoritarian World; 8. Conclusion.
About the author
Christopher Carothers is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania.
Summary
Corruption Control in Authoritarian Regimes argues that authoritarian anti-corruption reform is more common than widely thought and follows a different playbook than democratic anti-corruption reform. Using case studies from China, South Korea, and Taiwan, Christopher Carothers constructs an original theory of authoritarian corruption control.
Foreword
Reveals how meaningful corruption control by authoritarian regimes is surprisingly common and follows a different playbook than democratic anti-corruption reform.
Additional text
'Corruption Control in Authoritarian Regimes addresses the classical question of whether dictatorships can curb the predatory behavior of their agents. Chris Carothers' invaluable comparative study of how three dictatorships in East Asia tackled corruption provides an original and persuasive answer. This book is a major contribution to the literature on corruption in general, and on the political economy of authoritarianism in particular.' Minxin Pei, Claremont McKenna College
