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"Liberal concepts of democracy envision courts as key institutions for the promotion and protection of democratic regimes. Yet social science scholarship suggests that courts are fundamentally constrained in ways that undermine their ability to do so. Recognizing these constraints, this book argues that courts can influence regime instability by affecting inter-elite conflict. They do so in three ways: by helping leaders credibly reveal their rationales for policy choices that may appear to violate legal rules; by encouraging leaders to less frequently make decisions that raise concerns about rule violations; and by encouraging the opposition to accept potential rule violations. In each way, courts promote the prudent use of power. We evaluate implications of this argument using a century of global data tracking judicial politics and democratic survival"--
List of contents
1. Introduction; 2. Democratic regimes and their survival; 3. Political competition and judicial independence; 4. Judicial effects on democratic regime stability; 5. Imprudent politics; 6. Will courts be bulwarks of democracy in the United States?; 7. Conclusion.
About the author
Jeffrey K. Staton is Professor of Political Science and Senior Associate Dean of Laney Graduate School, Emory University. He is the author of Judicial Power and Strategic Communication in Mexico (Cambridge University Press, 2010). His research has been supported by the National Science Foundation.Christopher Reenock is Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida State University. He is the co-author of Democratic Policymaking (Cambridge University Press, 2017). His work has been supported by the National Science Foundation and he has been the recipient of the Herbert Kaufman award and the Beryl Radin award.Jordan Holsinger is a Ph.D. candidate at Florida State University. His research focuses on the role of NGOs as promoters of civil society in authoritarian regimes. His research agenda also includes projects on the role of NGOs in authoritarian contexts and the politics of repression.
Summary
Argues that courts can defend democracy by encouraging prudence on the part of leaders and the opposition, making each less likely to pursue troubling policies. The book evaluates the argument with original empirical studies, drawing on 115 years of data on a global sample of democratic regimes.
Foreword
This book argues that independent courts can defend democracy by encouraging political elites to more prudently exercise their powers.
