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By developing a new theory of reasons for action, Daniel Whiting addresses key debates in metaethics (concerning normative reasons) and epistemology (concerning the norms for belief). He offers a comprehensive account of the various norms governing belief, the relations among them, and the unifying principle that underlies them all.
List of contents
- 1: Introduction
- 2: Reasons and Their Roles
- 3: Justifying and Demanding
- 4: A Modal Theory of Reasons
- 5: Possessing Reasons
- 6: Subjective Reasons
- 7: Truth
- 8: Knowledge
- 9: Rational Belief
- 10: Conclusion
About the author
Daniel Whiting is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton, where he was Head of Department from 2016-19. He is the current Director of the Mind Association. His publications numerous journal articles as well as
Metaepistemology (OUP, 2018) and
Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (OUP, 2018), both co-edited with Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way. He led an international network on 'Higher-Order Evidence in Epistemology, Ethics, and Aesthetics' (2019-21) and was Principal Investigator on the research project 'Normativity: Epistemic and Practical' (2013-15), both supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. Before joining Southampton, Daniel studied and taught at the University of Reading.
Summary
By developing a new theory of reasons for action, Daniel Whiting addresses key debates in metaethics (concerning normative reasons) and epistemology (concerning the norms for belief). He offers a comprehensive account of the various norms governing belief, the relations among them, and the unifying principle that underlies them all.
Additional text
A reader can't fail to appreciate the high level of detail of the analyses, the depth of the discussion and the care with which the author tries to address even the tiniest issues. [...] I would highly recommend [...] this extremely well informed, ambitious and thought-provoking book.
