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List of contents
Introduction: The Problem of Hiero II
1. Atomic War – The Influence of Lucretius on Machiavelli’s Art of War
2. Practical Proportions: Aelianus Tacticus in Machiavelli’s Art of War
3. Industries of Failure? Mercenaries and the Arms of Others
4. Instrumental and Aleatory Aspects of Auxiliary Force in Machiavelli
5. Transforming Compounds: Machiavelli’s Analyses of Mixed Force
Conclusion: Captains of Critique
Bibliography
Index
About the author
Sean Erwin is Professor of Philosophy at Barry University, USA.
Summary
Central to Niccolò Machiavelli’s writing is the argument that a successful state is one that prefers to lose with its own arms (arma propriis) than to win with the arms of others (arma alienis). This book sheds light on Machiavelli’s critiques of military force and provides an important reinterpretation of his military theory.
Sean Erwin argues that the distinction between arma propriis and arma alienis poses a central problem to Machiavelli’s case for why modern political institutions offer modes of political existence that ancient ones did not. Starting from the influence of Lucretius and Aelianus Tacticus on the Dell'arte della guerra, Erwin examines Machiavelli’s criticism of mercenary, auxiliary, and mixed forces.
Giving due consideration to an overlooked conceptual distinction in Machiavelli studies, this book is a valuable and original contribution to the field.
Foreword
Investigates Niccolò Machiavelli’s critiques of military force based on the distinction he makes between arma alienis and arma propriis.
Additional text
This book is a philosophically sophisticated and historically sensitive study that sheds important new light on the significance of Machiavelli’s writings on the question of military force. It should be essential reading for all scholars who work within the field of Machiavelli studies.
