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Claims about consciousness in animals are often made in support of their moral standing. Peter Carruthers argues that there is no fact of the matter about animal consciousness and it is of no scientific or ethical significance. Sympathy for an animal can be grounded in its mental states, but should not rely on assumptions about its consciousness.
List of contents
- 1: Important preliminaries
- 2: Animal minds: The state of the art
- 3: The need for a theory
- 4: Some initial possibilities
- 5: Global-workspace theory
- 6: Explaining the "hard" problem
- 7: Animal consciousness: No fact of the matter
- 8: Does consciousness matter?
About the author
Peter Carruthers is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland. He is the author of numerous articles and books in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and has co-edited seven volumes of interdisciplinary essays in cognitive science. His recent publications include The Opacity of Mind (OUP, 2011) and The Centered Mind (OUP, 2015). In 2018, he won the annual Romanell Prize awarded by the American Philosophical Association.
Summary
The continuities between human and animal minds are increasingly well understood. This has led many people to make claims about consciousness in animals, which has often been taken to be crucial for their moral standing. Peter Carruthers argues compellingly that there is no fact of the matter to be discovered, and that the question of animal consciousness is of no scientific or ethical significance.
Carruthers offers solutions to two related puzzles. The first is about the place of phenomenal--or felt--consciousness in the natural order. Consciousness is shown to comprise fine-grained nonconceptual contents that are "globally broadcast" to a wide range of cognitive systems for reasoning, decision-making, and verbal report. Moreover, the so-called "hard" problem of consciousness results merely from the distinctive first-person concepts we can use when thinking about such contents. No special non-physical properties--no so-called "qualia"--are involved. The second puzzle concerns the distribution of phenomenal consciousness across the animal kingdom. Carruthers shows that there is actually no fact of the matter, because thoughts about consciousness in other creatures require us to project our first-person concepts into their minds; but such projections fail to result in determinate truth-conditions when those minds are significantly unlike our own. This upshot, however, doesn't matter. It doesn't matter for science, because no additional property enters the world as one transitions from creatures that are definitely incapable of phenomenal consciousness to those that definitely are (namely, ourselves). And on many views it doesn't matter for ethics, either, since concern for animals can be grounded in sympathy, which requires only third-person understanding of the desires and emotions of the animals in question, rather than in first-person empathy.
Additional text
Peter Carruthers stands out among philosophers for having previously argued that most animals lack conscious experiences. He returns to the question of non-human consciousness in Human and Animal Minds with another striking view. Where he once proposed that the capacity for higher-order thoughts is essential to phenomenal consciousness and restricted to a small number of species, he now regards its significance as indeterminate. He infers that for many species, there is no fact of the matter either way.
