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Explores how the central question of philosophy of law is the legal subject's: how can that be law for me?
List of contents
1. The Puzzle of Very Unjust Law I: Hart and Dworkin; 2. The Puzzle of Very Unjust Law II: Hobbes; 3. The Constitution of Legal Authority/The Authority of Legal Constitutions; 4. The Janus-Faced Constitution; 5. The Politics of Legal Space; 6. Legality's Promise; Appendix I. Exclusive and Inclusive Legal Positivism; Appendix II. Kantian Private Law Theory; Appendix III. John Finnis and 'Schmittean Logic'.
About the author
David Dyzenhaus is University Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto, Canada. He works on legality under stress, an interest that he developed as a law student in apartheid South Africa. As one of the leading theorists of the rule of law, his work both reshapes philosophy of law and connects its most abstract concerns to the practical dilemmas human rights lawyers face.
Summary
This book fundamentally reshapes philosophy of law by making central to its inquiry legality and the rule of law, constitutional theory, political theory, international law, the social contract, and legitimacy. It also shows the way in which the legal theories of Thomas Hobbes and Hans Kelsen enrich current debates.
Additional text
‘How the social fact of power is transformed into the normative relationship of authority is a genuine and deep puzzle in the philosophy of law. Dyzenhaus traces how legal positivists, starting with Hobbes, have attended to the way in which the law maintains a relationship of mutual respect and accountability between ruler and subject. His provocative claim is that ‘long arc of legality’ from Hobbes through Kelsen to Hart reveals the ways in which legal positivists have subtly incorporated insights from their major critics – the natural lawyers – to answer the question of how law can have legitimate authority for its subjects. Through careful analysis of their contributions, he develops a distinctive account of the authority of law, capable of answering the question, ‘But, how can that be law for me?’’ W. Bradley Wendel, Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School
