Fr. 55.50

Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience - 2nd Edition

English · Paperback / Softback

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The second edition of the seminal work in the field-revised, updated, and extendedIn Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker outline and address the conceptual confusions encountered in various neuroscientific and psychological theories. The result of a collaboration between an esteemed philosopher and a distinguished neuroscientist, this remarkable volume presents an interdisciplinary critique of many of the neuroscientific and psychological foundations of modern cognitive neuroscience. The authors point out conceptual entanglements in a broad range of major neuroscientific and psychological theories-including those of such neuroscientists as Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Dehaene, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Libet, Penrose, Posner, Raichle and Tononi, as well as psychologists such as Baar, Frith, Glynn, Gregory, William James, Weiskrantz, and biologists such as Dawkins, Humphreys, and Young. Confusions arising from the work of philosophers such as Dennett, Chalmers, Churchland, Nagel and Searle are subjected to detailed criticism. These criticisms are complemented by constructive analyses of the major cognitive, cogitative, emotional and volitional attributes that lie at the heart of cognitive neuroscientific research.Now in its second edition, this groundbreaking work has been exhaustively revised and updated to address current issues and critiques. New discussions offer insight into functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the notions of information and representation, conflict monitoring and the executive, minimal states of consciousness, integrated information theory and global workspace theory. The authors also reply to criticisms of the fundamental arguments posed in the first edition, defending their conclusions regarding mereological fallacy, the necessity of distinguishing between empirical and conceptual questions, the mind-body problem, and more. Essential as both a comprehensive reference work and as an up-to-date critical review of cognitive neuroscience, this landmark volume: Provides a scientifically and philosophically informed survey of the conceptual problems in a wide variety of neuroscientific theories Offers a clear and accessible presentation of the subject, minimizing the use of complex philosophical and scientific jargon Discusses how the ways the brain relates to the mind affect the intelligibility of neuroscientific research Includes fresh insights on mind-body and mind-brain relations, and on the relation between the notion of person and human being Features more than 100 new pages and a wealth of additional diagrams, charts, and tables Continuing to challenge and educate readers like no other book on the subject, the second edition of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience is required reading not only for neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, but also for academics, researchers, and students involved in the study of the mind and consciousness....

List of contents

Foreword to the Second Edition by Denis Noble xvii
 
Foreword to the First Edition by Denis Noble xx
 
Acknowledgements to the Second Edition xxiii
 
Acknowledgements to the First Edition xxiv
 
Introduction to the First Edition 1
 
Introduction to the Second Edition 8
 
Part I Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots 15
 
Preliminaries to Part I 17
 
1 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical Roots 17
 
2 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Conceptual Roots 20
 
1 The Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System 21
 
1.1 Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: The Origins of the Ventricular Doctrine 22
 
1.2 Fernel and Descartes: The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine 32
 
1.3 The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and Its Aftermath 38
 
1.4 The Concept of a Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall 41
 
1.5 Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig 46
 
1.6 The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sherrington 48
 
1.6.1 The dependence of psychological capacities on the functioning of cortex: localization determined non-invasively by Ogawa and Sokolof 49
 
1.6.2 Caveats concerning the use of fMRI to determine the areas of cortex involved in supporting psychological powers 52
 
2 The Cortex and the Mind in the Work of Sherrington and His Protégés 56
 
2.1 Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact 56
 
2.2 Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism 60
 
2.3 John Eccles and the 'Liaison Brain' 62
 
2.4 Wilder Penfield and the 'Highest Brain Mechanism' 69
 
3 The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience 79
 
3.1 Mereological Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience 79
(Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Damasio, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird)
 
3.2 Challenging the Consensus: The Brain Is Not the Subject of Psychological Attributes 81
(Greenfield)
 
3.3 Qualms Concerning Ascription of a Mereological Fallacy to Neuroscience 85
(Ullman, Blakemore, Gregory, Dennett, Searle)
 
3.4 Replies to Objections 87
(Ullman, Crick, Young, Zeki, Milner, Squire and Kandel, Gregory, Marr, Frisby, Sperry and Gazzaniga, Blakemore, Searle, Dennett)
 
4 An Overview of the Conceptual Field of Cognitive Neuroscience: Evidence, the Inner, Introspection, Privileged Access, Privacy and Subjectivity 94
 
4.1 On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to a Being 95
 
4.2 On the Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity 99
(Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick)
 
4.3 The Inner 103
(Damasio)
 
4.4 Introspection 104
(Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz)
 
4.5 Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect 106
(Blakemore)
 
4.6 Privacy or Subjectivity 108
(Searle)
 
4.7 The Meaning of Psychological Predicates: How They Are Explained and Learned 111
 
4.8 Of the Mind and Its Nature 117
(Gazzaniga, Doty)
 
Part II Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis 121
 
Preliminaries to Part II 123
 
1 Brain-Body Dualism 123
(Searle)
 
2 The Project 125
 
3 The Category of the Psychological 129
 
5 Sensation and Perception 133
 
5.1 Sensation 133
(Searle, Libet, Geldard and Sherrick)
 
5.2 Perception 137
(Crick)
 
5.2.1 Perception as the causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities 140
(Kandel, Schwartz and Jessell, Rock)
 
5.2.2 Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz 146
(Helmholtz, Gregor

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