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List of contents
1. Introduction; 2. A formal model of outbidding; 3. The evidence; 4. Outbidding, capacity, and government enforcement; 5. Outbidding as deterrence: endogenous demands in the shadow of group competition; 6. Cornering the market: counterterrorism in the shadow of group formation; Conclusion.
About the author
Justin Conrad is Associate Professor of International Affairs at the University of Georgia and Director of the Center for International Trade and Security.William Spaniel is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh.
Summary
A political economy approach to understanding how militant groups use violence to capture attention and resources. These findings are relevant to scholars of terrorism, political violence, and foreign policy. This is a timely contribution to the research on militant group fragmentation, rivalry, fratricide and demonstrative violence.
Additional text
'While the concept of outbidding has been an important principle in understanding violent group escalation, Conrad and Spaniel move this discussion beyond the simple 'more groups equals more conflict' story. Using rigorous formal theory, connected empirical tests and important case analysis, Conrad and Spaniel show how the second-order effects of militant group competition can lead to unexpected outcomes. While this book will appeal to serious social scientists and scholars of political violence, Conrad and Spaniel address the critical policy implications of the novel theory and data analysis making the book applicable to the public, policymakers, and political scientists. I will assign it in my courses on political violence and terrorism at the undergraduate and graduate level. Joseph K. Young, American University
