Common Pool Resources - Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information

A textbook for students of economics introducing the analysis of common pool resources, using basic game-theory tools.

List of contents

Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Common pool resources in a static setting; 3. Common pool resources in a dynamic setting; 4. Entry deterrence in the commons; 5. Repeated interaction in the commons; 6. Commons under incomplete information; 7. Signaling in the commons; Appendix A: game theory tools; Appendix B: solutions of selected end-of-chapter exercises.

About the author

Ana Espinola-Arredondo is a Professor in the School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.Felix Muñoz-Garcia is a Professor in the School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.

Summary

This textbook uses game theory to explain common resource management. It is intended for students in economics, business, public policy, and other social sciences, both at the undergraduate and graduate levels, taking courses in natural resource economics and management, or in environmental economics.

Product details

• Authors: Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Ana (Washington State Universi Espinola-Arredondo, Felix Muñoz-Garcia
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press ELT
• Languages: English
• Product format: Paperback / Softback
• Released: 30.04.2021
• EAN: 9781108926270
• ISBN: 978-1-108-92627-0
• No. of pages: 200
• Subjects: Natural sciences, medicine, IT, technology > Natural sciences (general); Social sciences, law, business > Law > Mercantile and commercial law; BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Environmental Economics, LAW / Natural Resources, Environmental Economics, Energy & natural resources law, Energy and natural resources law