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Bridging phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, Peter Antich asserts that the latter has long been hampered by an inadequate phenomenology of knowledge. However, a careful description of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenon of motivation can offer compelling new ways to think about knowledge and longstanding epistemological questions.
List of contents
List of Illustrations xi
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
Part I. Defining the Account
1 Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Motivation
2 The Primacy of Perception
Part II. Defending the Account
3 Empirical Judgments
4 Universal and A Priori Judgments
5 Perceptual Faith
Part III. Motivation and Pure Reason
6 Transcendental Justification
7 Metaphysical Judgments and Self-Consciousness
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
About the author
Peter Antich is visiting assistant professor of philosophy at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut. His publications include "Merleau-Ponty on Hallucination and Perceptual Faith," in
Études Phénoménologiques - Phenomenological Studies, "Perceptual Experience in Kant and Merleau-Ponty," in the
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, and "Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Concept Formation," in the
History of Philosophy Quarterly.
Summary
Bridging phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, Peter Antich asserts that the latter has long been hampered by an inadequate phenomenology of knowledge. However, a careful description of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenon of motivation can offer compelling new ways to think about knowledge and longstanding epistemological questions.
