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Articulates and defends a novel theory of properties and propositions, based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects.
List of contents
Introduction; 1. Substitution in a Sense; 2. The Term/Predicate Distinction; 3. Ramsey's Challenge; 4. Two Types of Reference; 5. The Reference Principle; 6. Fregean Realism; 7. Fregean Nominalism; 8. Some ; 9. The Concept Horse Paradox; 10. The Metaphysics Exam; 11. States of A airs; 12. The Prenective View of Propositional Content; 13. On Content and Object; 14. The Identity Theory of Truth; References; Index.
About the author
Robert Trueman is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of York. He is the author of numerous articles on philosophical logic and metaphysics in journals including Philosophical Studies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Mind.
Summary
This book articulates and defends a novel, Fregean theory of properties and propositions, and uses it to solve a range of problems in metaphysics. It will be of interest to anyone working in logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language or the philosophy of mind.
Additional text
'This is just the sort of book I like. Trueman enters one of the most notorious of philosophical swamps - Frege's puzzle of the concept horse - and emerges triumphant at the other end, in an outstanding display of clarity, rigor, and philosophical sense. And that's just the beginning. Trueman goes on to generalize his resolution of the puzzle to a satisfying and wide-ranging philosophy of logic; all of this while remaining pleasingly attentive to historical sources and writing wonderful prose. Properties and Propositions is sure to be a standard reference for years to come.' Agustín Rayo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
