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Informationen zum Autor Michael Maschler was a Professor at the Einstein Institute of Mathematics and the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He greatly contributed to cooperative game theory and to repeated games with incomplete information. Eilon Solan is a Professor of Mathematics at Tel Aviv University. He currently serves as the Director of the Beno Arbel program for gifted young students, and as the Academic Director of the Israeli team to the IMO. Shmuel Zamir is a Professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a founding member of the Center for Study of Rationality, and is the editor-in-chief of the International Journal of Game Theory (IJGT). Klappentext A mathematically-oriented, comprehensive textbook in game theory for students in Mathematics, Economics, and Engineering, at both undergraduate and graduate levels, this new edition is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of the technical explanations and the inclusion of numerous exercises and worked examples. Zusammenfassung A mathematically-oriented, comprehensive textbook in game theory for students in Mathematics, Economics, and Engineering, at both undergraduate and graduate levels, this new edition is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of the technical explanations and the inclusion of numerous exercises and worked examples. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. The game of chess; 2. Utility theory; 3. Extensive-form games; 4. Strategic-form games; 5. Mixed strategies; 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem; 7. Equilibrium refinements; 8. Correlated equilibria; 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors; 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model; 11. The universal belief space; 12. Auctions; 13. Repeated games; 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs; 15. Social choice; 16. Bargaining games; 17. Coalitional games with transferable utility; 18. The core; 19. The Shapley value; 20. The bargaining set; 21. The nucleolus; 22. Stable matching; 23. Appendices....
List of contents
1. The game of chess; 2. Utility theory; 3. Extensive-form games; 4. Strategic-form games; 5. Mixed strategies; 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem; 7. Equilibrium refinements; 8. Correlated equilibria; 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors; 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model; 11. The universal belief space; 12. Auctions; 13. Repeated games; 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs; 15. Social choice; 16. Bargaining games; 17. Coalitional games with transferable utility; 18. The core; 19. The Shapley value; 20. The bargaining set; 21. The nucleolus; 22. Stable matching; 23. Appendices.
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Praise for first edition: 'This is the book for which the world has been waiting for decades: a definitive, comprehensive account of the mathematical theory of games, by three of the world's biggest experts on the subject. Rigorous yet eminently readable, deep yet comprehensible, replete with a large variety of important real-world applications, it will remain the standard reference in game theory for a very long time.' Robert Aumann, Nobel Laureate in Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem