Read more
Though science and philosophy take different approaches to ontology, metaphysical inferences are relevant to interpreting scientific work, and empirical investigations are relevant to philosophy. This book argues that there is no uniquely rational way to determine which domains of ontology are appropriate for belief, making room for choice in a transformative account of scientific ontology.
List of contents
- Preface
- Part I: Naturalized Metaphysics
- Chapter 1: Ontology: scientific and meta-scientific
- 1.1 Scientific and philosophical conceptions of ontology
- 1.2 Deflationary ontology: historicism; sociology; pragmatics
- 1.3 Ontological limits: empiricism; scientific realism; metaphysics
- 1.4 Do case studies of science settle ontological disputes?
- 1.5 Examples of the robustness of ontology under cases
- Chapter 2: Science and metaphysics, then and now
- 2.1 Ontology and the nature of metaphysical inference
- 2.2 Is modern science inherently metaphysical?
- 2.3 Epistemic stances regarding scientific ontology
- 2.4 Metaphysical inferences: lowercase 'm' versus capital 'M'
- 2.5 The (possible) autonomy of (some) metaphysics from science
- Chapter 3: Naturalism and the grounding metaphor
- 3.1 In hopes of a demarcation of scientific ontology
- 3.2 On conflating the a priori with that which is prior
- 3.3 How not to naturalize metaphysical inferences
- 3.4 Unpacking the metaphors: "grounding" and "distance"
- 3.5 On the distinction between theorizing and speculating
- Part II: Illustrations and Morals
- Chapter 4: Dispositions: science as a basis for scientific ontology
- 4.1 How dispositions manifest in the philosophy of science
- 4.2 Explanatory power I: unifying aspects of scientific realism
- 4.3 Explanatory power II: giving scientific explanations
- 4.4 Explanatory power III: consolidating scientific knowledge
- 4.5 Property identity and the actual power of explanatory power
- Chapter 5: Structures: science as a constraint on scientific ontology
- 5.1 Thinking about ontology in the domain of fundamental physics
- 5.2 Situating an ontological inquiry into subatomic "particles"
- 5.3 Structuralist interpretations of the metaphysics of particles
- 5.4 Reasoning about ontological bedrock: an unavoidable dilemma
- 5.5 Dissolving the dilemma: the variability of belief and suspension
- Part III: Voluntarist Epistemology
- Chapter 6: Knowledge under ontological uncertainty
- 6.1 Inconsistent ontologies and incompatible beliefs
- 6.2 Belief and ontological pluralism: perspectival knowledge?
- 6.3 A trilemma for perspectivism: irrelevant; unstable; incoherent
- 6.4 Two kinds of context-transcendent pluralism about ontology
- 6.5 Ontological explanation and contrastive what-questions
- Chapter 7: The nature and provenance of epistemic stances
- 7.1 An indefeasible persistence of ontological disagreement
- 7.2 Stances revisited: deflationary; empiricist; metaphysical
- 7.3 A voluntarist primer on choosing stances and beliefs
- 7.4 Epistemic stances in conflict: rationality and robustness
- 7.5 In defense of permissive norms of rationality for stances
- Chapter 8: Coda: voluntarism with lessons from Pyrrho and Sextus
- 8.1 Getting to the bottom of it all, while awake
- 8.2 Skeptical arguments: some Modes of Agrippa
- 8.3 A Pyrrhonian analogy: isostheneia and aphasia
- 8.4 Extending analogy a bit further: ataraxia
- 8.5 A transformative epistemology of scientific ontology
- Bibliography
- Index
About the author
Anjan Chakravartty is the Appignani Foundation Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami, where he works on topics in the philosophy of science, metaphysics, and epistemology. He has taught previously at the Universities of Cambridge, Toronto, and Notre Dame.
Summary
Though science and philosophy take different approaches to ontology, metaphysical inferences are relevant to interpreting scientific work, and empirical investigations are relevant to philosophy. This book argues that there is no uniquely rational way to determine which domains of ontology are appropriate for belief, making room for choice in a transformative account of scientific ontology.
Additional text
A smart, historically informed, highly readable-and commendably nontechnical-defense of 'natural ontology', according to which science and metaphysics are inextricably intertwined. The book will be of interest to historians and philosophers of science, and to anyone who has wondered about the place of metaphysics in a world in which science has come to be the measure of all things.
