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"This book concerns a set of problems that arise from the distinctive conceptual and practical tension in the first period after a new constitution has been adopted. We shall argue that at a very general level, a new constitution must manage a balance or tension between two forces. These are aspirations for transformation and demands for preservation through entrenchment. The first period, as we will elaborate, is the conceptual, temporal, and institutional bridge between the past and future. It is the moment when the transformative and the preservative vectors of constitutional design can come into the sharpest conflict. The variable nature of these conflicts-and the diverse means through which they are mediated, whether successfully or less successfully-is the focus of both this introduction and, in different ways, the chapters that follow"--
List of contents
1. Introduction. The first-period problem of constitutional implementation Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq; Part I. The Problem of Transformation in Constitutional Design: 2. Looking 'backward' or 'forward' to American constitutional development: reflections on constitutional 'endurance' and 'adaptation' in the 'First Republic' Sanford Levinson; 3. Marking constitutional transitions: the law and politics of constitutional implementation in South Africa Rosalind Dixon and Theunis Roux; 4. India's first period: constitutional doctrine and constitutional stability Madhav Khosla; 5. Two steps 'forward', one step 'back'? Transformation and correction in the implementation of Ecuador's 2008 constitution Eric Alston; Part II. The Issue of Gender: 6. The long road ahead: the first period of a gender-responsive constitution in Zimbabwe Claudia Flores; 7. Constitutional reform and women's political participation: electoral gender quotas in post-Arab Spring Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan Susan H. Williams; Part III. Institutional Development and the Role of Courts: 8. Explaining the institutional role of the Colombian Constitutional Court Diego González; 9. Implementing a new constitution in a competitive authoritarian context: the case of Kenya James Thuo Gathii; Part IV. Authoritarian Transitions: 10. Transformational authoritarian constitutions: the case of Chile Tom Ginsburg; 11. Authoritarian straitjacket or vehicle for democratic transition?: the risky struggle to change Myanmar's constitution Melissa Crouch; 12. The Ethiopian constitution and ethnic federalism Daniel Abebe.
About the author
Tom Ginsburg is Leo Spitz Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, where he also holds an appointment in the Political Science Department. He also co-directs the Comparative Constitutions Project, an National Science Foundation-funded data set cataloging the world's constitutions since 1789. He is the author of several books, including How to Save a Constitutional Democracy (with Aziz Huq, 2018), Comparative Constitutional Law (with Rosalind Dixon, 2011), and The Endurance of National Constitutions (with Zachary Elkins and James Melton, 2009).Aziz Huq is Frank and Bernice Greenberg Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, where he teaches and researches in constitutional law. He is the author of How to Save a Constitutional Democracy (with Tom Ginsburg, 2018). His scholarship has won awards from the Association of American Law Schools, and been published in leading legal and peer-reviewed journals. Previously, Huq was Director of the Liberty and National Security Project of the Brennan Center for Justice, and a Senior Consultant Analyst for the International Crisis Group.
Summary
This volume uses theory and case studies to explore how the first moment of constitutional implementation actually plays out and helps defines a constitution's future. It will appeal to scholars and practitioners with an interest in how and why written constitutional promises actually succeed or fail.
