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Is Religious Education Possible?: A Philosophical Investigation tackles a well-established problem in the philosophy of education. The problem is the threat posed to the logical possibility of non-confessional religious education by the claim that religion constitutes an autonomous language-game or form of knowledge. Defenders of this claim argue that religion cannot be understood from the outside: it is impossible to impart religious understanding unless one is also prepared to impart religious belief.Michael Hand argues for two central points: first, that non-confessional religious education would indeed be impossible if it were true that religion constitutes a distinct form of knowledge; and, second, that religion does not in fact constitute a distinct form of knowledge.
List of contents
Foreword by Richard Pring
1. A philosophical problem
2. Understanding a form of knowledge
3. Is there a religious form of knowledge?
4. The meaning of religious propositions
5. mental and material propositions
6. Conclusion
Bibliography
About the author
Michael Hand is Professor of Philosophy of Education at the University of Birmingham, UK. He edits IMPACT, a pamphlet series offering philosophical perspectives on current education policy. He sits on the Executive Committee of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain (PESGB) and the Editorial Boards of Journal of Philosophy of Education, Theory and Research in Education and Journal of Philosophy in Schools.
Summary
Is Religious Education Possible?: A Philosophical Investigation tackles a well-established problem in the philosophy of education. The problem is the threat posed to the logical possibility of non-confessional religious education by the claim that religion constitutes an autonomous language-game or form of knowledge. Defenders of this claim argue that religion cannot be understood from the outside: it is impossible to impart religious understanding unless one is also prepared to impart religious belief.
Michael Hand argues for two central points: first, that non-confessional religious education would indeed be impossible if it were true that religion constitutes a distinct form of knowledge; and, second, that religion does not in fact constitute a distinct form of knowledge.
Additional text
‘This clearly argued essay presents an original perspective on a complex issue which should be of interest to many philosophers of education, as well as contributing to the literature on the justification of religious education as a curriculum subject.'
