Manipulating Courts in New Democracies - Forcing Judges Off the Bench in Argentina

List of contents

1. Introduction 2. Judicial turnover in new democracies: forcing judges off the bench 3. The political history of the manipulation of the Argentinean Supreme Court 4. Forcing justices off the bench: empirics from the Argentinean Supreme Court 5. The persistent manipulation of courts: empirics from the provincial Supreme Courts in Argentina 6. The institutional determinants of judicial turnover at the subnational level 7. Conclusion

About the author

Andrea Castagnola is an assistant professor at the School of Politics and Government at Universidad Nacional de San Martin, Argentina. She was assistant professor at Flacso-Mexico and holds a Post-Doc from the University of Bergen, Norway. Her research focuses on judicial politics in Latin America and Comparative Politics. Her work has been published in journals such as British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Journal of Politics in Latin America and Política y Gobierno.

Summary

Using original field data from Argentina's National Supreme Court and all twenty-four Provincial Supreme Courts, Andrea Castagnola develops a novel theory to explain forced retirements of judges.

Product details

• Authors: Andrea Castagnola, Andrea (University of Bergen Castagnola, Castagnola Andrea
• Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd.
• Languages: English
• Product format: Paperback / Softback
• Released: 30.09.2019
• EAN: 9780367372033
• ISBN: 978-0-367-37203-3
• No. of pages: 140
• Series: Routledge Studies in Latin American Politics
• Subjects: Social sciences, law, business > Law > General, dictionaries; POLITICAL SCIENCE / General, Argentina, POLITICAL SCIENCE / World / Caribbean & Latin American, POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / Judicial Branch, Political structures: democracy, Legal system: general, Legal systems: general, Political structures / systems: democracy