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Informationen zum Autor Daniel M. Brinks is Associate Professor in the Government Department and Law School at the University of Texas, Austin. He is also a Senior Researcher with the Christian Michelsen Institute. Klappentext Analyzes the political roots of the systems of constitutional justice in Latin America, tracing their development over the last 40 years. Zusammenfassung This book traces the development of constitutional courts in Latin America! and develops concepts such as judicial autonomy and authority. It aims to understand the design of judicial institutions and combines qualitative and quantitative evidence to explore the basic purpose of constitutional justice. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Constitutional justice in the Americas at the turn of the Millennium; 2. Judicial power and the design of constitutional justice; 3. The political origins of powerful constitutional courts: constitutional governance and the politics of judicial design; 4. Identifying the political origins of constitutional justice through quantitative analysis; 5. Guatemala (1985): building constitutional justice in the shadow of Civil War; 6. Argentina (1994): negotiating a plural space of constitutional justice; 7. Bolivia (2009): governance logic in the new constitutionalism; 8. Conclusion: the politics of constitutional justice; Appendix A. Judicial power: concepts and measures.
