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Illustrated with historical analysis, case studies, and accessible economic concepts, this book explains what financial crises are, how they are caused and what we can learn from them.
List of contents
Introduction; Part I. Financial Crises: 1. Financial crises: categories and risk factors; 2. Growth, globalization, and financial crises; Part II. Five Case Studies: 3. The Great Depression, 1929-1939; 4. The Latin American Debt Crisis, 1982-1989; 5. The Asian Crisis, 1997-1999; 6. The Subprime Crisis in the United States; 7. The financial crisis in Europe; Part III. Lessons: 8. Markets do not self-regulate; 9. Shadow banks are banks; 10. Banks need more capital, less debt; 11. Monetary policy does not always work; 12. Fiscal multipliers are larger than expected; 13. Monetary integration requires fiscal integration; 14. Open capital markets can be dangerous; 15. Not all debt is created equal; Conclusion.
About the author
James Gerber is a Professor of Economics, Emeritus at San Diego State University. He is the author of International Economics (2018), a best-selling textbook now in its 7th edition, and numerous works on US-Mexico economic relations, including Fifty Years of Change on the US-Mexico Border: Growth, Development, and Quality of Life (with Joan Anderson, 2008) which won the Association of Borderlands Studies Book Award.
Summary
Illustrated with historical analysis, case studies, and accessible economic concepts, this book explains what financial crises are, how they are caused and what we can learn from them. It will appeal to university students as well as general readers who are curious to learn more about the recent subprime crisis and other financial crises.
Additional text
'James Gerber offers a coherent and incisive overview of the major financial crises of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. He describes the factors that precipitated each crisis, presents a chronological account, and reviews the subsequent changes in financial regulations and institutional mechanisms. His book is an admirable synthesis of the causes of financial instability and policies to mitigate it.' Joseph P. Joyce, M. Margaret Ball Professor of International Relations, Wellesley College, Massachsetts
