Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice

This volume, based on the Royal Institute of Philosophy's annual lecture series for 2017-18, explores epistemic practice.

List of contents

1. Harms and wrongs in epistemic practice Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar and Trystan S. Goetze; 2. Can closed-mindedness be an intellectual virtue? Heather Battaly; 3. Caring for esteem and intellectual reputation: some epistemic benefits and harms Alessandra Tanesini; 4. Understanding epistemic trust injustices and their harms Heidi Grasswick; 5. On anger, silence, and epistemic injustice Alison Bailey; 6. Just say 'no!': obligations to voice disagreement Casey Rebecca Johnson; 7. On empathy and testimonial trust Olivia Bailey; 8. Ambivalence about forgiveness Miranda Fricker; 9. The epistemology of terrorism and radicalisation Quassim Cassam; 10. Healthcare practice, epistemic injustice, and naturalism Ian James Kidd and Havi Carel; 11. What is epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorising? Keith Harris.

Summary

This volume, based on the Royal Institute of Philosophy's annual lecture series for 2017–18, explores epistemic practice, examining the various ways in which epistemic practices go wrong at the level of both individual agents and social structures, and discussing how these problems are related, and how they may be addressed.

Product details

• Authors: Simon Barker
• Assisted by: Simon Barker (Editor), Charlie Crerar (Editor), Trystan S. Goetze (Editor)
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Languages: English
• Product format: Paperback / Softback
• Released: 28.02.2019
• No. of pages: 262
• Dimensions: 241 mm x 228 mm x 10 mm
• Weight: 380 g
• Series: Royal Institute of Philosophy
• Subject: Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Philosophy: general, reference works