Read more
Zusatztext Bussell's research provides an intriguing insight into constituency service in patronage democracies with useful nuances for understanding under what conditions politicians will act in a partisan or non-partisan basis. These nuances are supported by arguments carefully constructed around data and evidence. Importantly, the book also opens the door for further research. Informationen zum Autor Jennifer Bussell is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. She studies comparative politics with an emphasis on the political economy of development, democratic representation, and governance outcomes, principally in South Asia and Africa. She is also the author of Corruption and Reform In India: Public Services in the Digital Age. Klappentext This book provides a theoretical and empirical examination of constituency service in developing countries. The predominant view of distributive politics in "patronage democracies" emphasizes the partisan targeting of pork and clientelism. In contrast, this book demonstrates that high-level legislators in India and other contexts often provide direct, non-partisan assistance to individual constituents. Zusammenfassung Scholars of distributive politics often emphasize partisanship and clientelism. However, as Jennifer Bussell demonstrates in Clients and Constituents, legislators in "patronage democracies" also provide substantial constituency service: non-contingent, direct assistance to individual citizens. Bussell shows how the uneven character of access to services at the local level-often due to biased allocation on the part of local intermediaries-generates demand for help from higher-level officials. The nature of these appeals in turn provides incentives for politicians to help their constituents obtain public benefits. Drawing on a new cross-national dataset and extensive evidence from India-including sustained qualitative shadowing of politicians, novel elite and citizen surveys, and an experimental audit study with a near census of Indian state and national legislators-this book provides a theoretical and empirical examination of political responsiveness in developing countries. It highlights the potential for an under-appreciated form of democratic accountability, one that is however rooted in the character of patronage-based politics. Inhaltsverzeichnis List of Tables List of Figures Preface Acknowledgements PART I - The Puzzle of Constituency Service 1) Introduction: Representation, Distribution, and Constituency Service 2) Political Responsiveness in a Patronage Democracy 3) The Provision of Constituency Service PART II - The Sources of Constituency Service 4) Clients or Constituents? A Theory of Assistance in Patronage Democracies 5) Access to Services in a Patronage Democracy: The Case of India 6) Partisan Targeting and Local Distributive Politics 7) Local Blocking and Appeals for Assistance 8) Partisanship, the Personal Vote, and Constituency Service 9) Which Politicians Respond? 10) When is Responsiveness Partisan Bias? Part III - The Significance of Constituency Service 11) Constituency Service in Comparative Perspective 12) Constrained Accountability in Patronage Democracies Bibliography Appendix ...
