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This book, first published in 1992, provides an in-depth analysis of the EC policy-making processes elating to trade protection. It argues that the decision-making process is biased towards national policy-makers, leading to the political determination of the EC's administered protection, with the outcome being that protection is geared towards domestic producer interests seeking relief from import competition. This study offers a unique perspective because it locates the analysis of EC trade protection within the wider framework of EC decision-making processes.
List of contents
1. Introduction 2. Protectionism – An Intra-National Prisoners’ Dilemma 3. European Community Policy Making 4. The Trade Policy Instruments 5. National Protection Based on Article 115, Treaty of Rome 6. Voluntary Export Restraints 7. Antidumping 8. Antidumping Against Central and Eastern Europe 9. The Single European Market 10. Conclusion
About the author
Ludger Schuknecht
Summary
This reissue (1992) provides an in-depth analysis of the EC policy-making processes relating to trade protection. It argues that the decision-making process is biased towards national policy-makers, leading to the political determination of the EC’s administered protection.
Additional text
‘An important contribution to our understanding of how international trade policy is conducted in the European Community.’ Ayre L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
‘Careful documentation of EC administered protection and a sensible exposition of its public choice logic: who is in the position to influence it and how it advances their interests at the expense of the people of the Community.’ J. Michael Finger, The World Bank
‘This well-timed and well-informed book … shows why Europe may fail to seize the opportunity it faces, despite the gains that openness might promise. The absurdity in much of standard economists’ treatment of trade policy is laid bare … Once we come to understand that policy is determined in the "politics of interest" within Europe … we may begin to design constitutional structures that will promote the overall interest of the public, European and non-European alike.’ James M. Buchanan, Nobel Laureate in Economics
