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Evan N. Resnick examines the negotiating tables between the United States and its allies of convenience since World War II and sets forth a novel theory of alliance bargaining. Resnick's neoclassical realist theory explains why U.S. leaders negotiate less effectively with unfriendly autocratic states than with friendly liberal ones.
List of contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Alliances of Convenience in International Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy
1. Contending Theories of U.S. Bargaining with Allies of Convenience
2. The U.S. Alliance with the People’s Republic of China, 1971–1989
3. The U.S. Alliance with Pakistan, 1981–1988
4. The U.S. Alliance with Iraq, 1982–1988
5. The U.S. “Special Relationship” Alliance with the United Kingdom, 1950–1953
Conclusion
Notes
Index
About the author
Evan N. Resnick is an assistant professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Summary
Evan N. Resnick examines the negotiating tables between the United States and its allies of convenience since World War II and sets forth a novel theory of alliance bargaining. Resnick’s neoclassical realist theory explains why U.S. leaders negotiate less effectively with unfriendly autocratic states than with friendly liberal ones.
Additional text
Allies of Convenience addresses an important but understudied topic, advances a novel argument, pits that argument against plausible competitors drawn from the literature, compiles a rich body of historical evidence to adjudicate among rival claims, and derives provocative implications, especially for policy. There is no other book that deals with alliances of convenience per se, and certainly not one that deftly combines theory, history, and policy import. This book should have an easy time standing out.
