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Informationen zum Autor David Fitzgerald is a Lecturer in the School of History, University College Cork, Ireland. His books include Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine from Vietnam to Iraq (Stanford, 2013) and Obama, US Foreign Policy and the Dilemmas of Intervention (with David Ryan, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). David Ryan is Professor of Modern History at University College Cork, Ireland. He is the author of many books, including U.S. Foreign Policy and the Other , edited with Michael Cullinane (Berghahn, 2015), and Frustrated Empire: US Foreign Policy from 9/11 to Iraq (Pluto and University of Michigan, 2007). John M. Thompson is Senior Strategic Analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. His books include Progressivism in America: Past, Present and Future (with David Woolner, Oxford University Press, 2016) and the "Discovery" of Europe (with Hans Krabbendam, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Klappentext Offers essential perspectives on the Cold War and post-9/11 eras and explores the troubling implications of the American tendency to fight wars without end. "Featuring lucid and penetrating essays by a stellar roster of scholars, the volume provides deep insights into one of the grand puzzles of the age: why the U.S. has so often failed to exit wars on its terms."- Fredrik Logevall, Laurence D. Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan: Taken together, these conflicts are the key to understanding more than a half century of American military history. In addition, they have shaped, in profound ways, the culture and politics of the United States-as well as the nations in which they have been fought. This volume brings together international experts on American history and foreign affairs to assess the cumulative impact of the United States' often halting and conflicted attempts to end wars. From the introduction: The refusal to engage in historical thinking, that form of reflection deeply immersed in the US experience of war and intervention, means that this cultural amnesia is related to a strategic incoherence and, in these wars, the United States has failed in its strategic objectives because it did not define, precisely, what they were. If Vietnam was the tragedy, Iraq and Afghanistan were repeated failures. The objectives and the national interests were elusive beyond issues of credibility, identity, and revenge; the end point was undefined because it was not clear what the point was. What did the United States want from these wars? What did it want to leave behind? Zusammenfassung This volume brings together international experts on American history and foreign affairs to assess the cumulative impact of the United States' efforts to end wars. It offers essential perspectives on both the Cold War and post-9/11 eras and demonstrates just how high the stakes are as the US confronts the possibility of war without end. Inhaltsverzeichnis Acknowledgments Introduction David Ryan and David Fitzgerald Part I: Vietnam Chapter 1. The Importance of Being Popular: Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Domestic Support for the Vietnam War Sarah Thelen Chapter 2. The Things They Carry: Vietnam and the Legacies of the American War Edwin A. Martini Chapter 3. "His Epitaph Is Also Ours": Robert McNamara, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, and the Vietnam War's Contested Usable Past David Kieran Chapter 4. After the Fall of Saigon: Strategic Implications of America's Involvement in Vietnam Robert K. Brigham Part II: Iraq and Afghanistan Chapter 5. The Ironies of Overwhelming "Victory": Exits and the Dislocation of the Gulf W...
