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Thisbook explores the ways in which democracies can win counterinsurgencies whenthey implement a proper strategy. At a time when the USA is retrenching fromtwo bungled foreign wars that involved deadly insurgent uprisings, this is a particularlyimportant argument. Succumbing to the trauma of those engagements and drawingthe wrong conclusions about counterinsurgency can only lead to further defeatin the future. Rather than assuming that counterinsurgency is ineffective, itis crucial to understand that a conventional response to an insurgent challengeis likely to fail. Counterinsurgency must be applied from the beginning, and ifdone properly can be highly effective, even when used by democratic regimes. Infact, because such regimes are often wealthier; have more experience atinstitution-building and functional governance; are more pluralistic in natureand therefore enjoy higher levels of legitimacy than do autocracies,democracies may have considerable advantages in counterinsurgency warfare.Rather than give up in despair, democracies should learn to leverage theseadvantages and implement them against future insurgencies.
List of contents
Chapter 1. Introduction.- Chapter 2. The Arguments.- Chapter 3. A Population-Centric CoinStrategy.- Chapter 4. Malaya.- Chapter 5.Vietnam.- Chapter 6. Iraq.- Chapter 7. Conclusions.- Works Cited
About the author
William
Patterson earned his PhD in International Studies from Old Dominion University,
Virginia, USA. He previously served a tour in Afghanistan with the US Army's
Human Terrain System conducting socio-cultural research in furtherance of the
USA counterinsurgency strategy. He is a graduate of the US Army's
Counterinsurgency Leaders Course. He has published articles in a variety of
scholarly journals, and currently serves with the US Department of State.
Summary
This
book explores the ways in which democracies can win counterinsurgencies when
they implement a proper strategy. At a time when the USA is retrenching from
two bungled foreign wars that involved deadly insurgent uprisings, this is a particularly
important argument. Succumbing to the trauma of those engagements and drawing
the wrong conclusions about counterinsurgency can only lead to further defeat
in the future. Rather than assuming that counterinsurgency is ineffective, it
is crucial to understand that a conventional response to an insurgent challenge
is likely to fail. Counterinsurgency must be applied from the beginning, and if
done properly can be highly effective, even when used by democratic regimes. In
fact, because such regimes are often wealthier; have more experience at
institution-building and functional governance; are more pluralistic in nature
and therefore enjoy higher levels of legitimacy than do autocracies,
democracies may have considerable advantages in counterinsurgency warfare.
Rather than give up in despair, democracies should learn to leverage these
advantages and implement them against future insurgencies.
